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I. INTRODUCTION
It is now commonplace for prospective adoptive parents to look
beyond their own nations in search of adoptable children. Where pro-
spective adopters live, there are too few adoptable children,1 and in
other countries there are too many. Yet many decades after the first
well-publicized cases of American adoptions of foreign children,2 "in-
tercountry adoption" still occurs by ad hoc legal process, sometimes in
a legal vacuum.3
To fill this void, The Hague Conference on Private International
Law has proposed a multilateral treaty, the 1993 Hague Convention
1. The U.S. shortage of adoptable children is really a shortage of adoptable, healthy, cau-
casian infants. Most prospective adopters seek infants or very young children, and most either
seek children of the same race or are deterred from adopting minority children by racially dis-
criminatory polices of adoption agencies. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children
Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. Rav. 1163, 1166 (1991).
2. See generally Richard R. Carlson, Transnational Adoption of Children, 23 TULSA L.J.
317, 324-35 (1988).
3. Id. at 335-76.
[Vol. 30:243
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on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercoun-
try Adoption,4 to create rules of procedure, conduct, choice of law,
international recognition of adoption decrees, and to establish institu-
tions for international oversight and cooperation. If the U.S. ratifies
the Convention, it must also adopt new federal legislation and en-
courage new state legislation to fulfill some important obligations
under the Convention.
One might ask whether the U.S. or the world needs a new inter-
national or domestic adoption law. Even without a clear law or policy,
intercountry adoption is a routine method of adoption in the U.S. and
many other nations. For those who adopt foreign-born children, how-
ever, the process is needlessly complex, risky, and uncertain for a
transaction in which so much is at stake.' Moreover, intercountry
adoption by Americans has actually declined recently, as some send-
ing nations6 have acted to discourage out-of-country placement. 7 Un-
fortunately, periodic crises and scandals in these countries have
fanned the debate whether intercountry adoption serves the best in-
terests of adoptable children or the national interests of their birth
lands.8
4. The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Final Act of the Seventeenth Ses-
sion, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134 [hereinafter Hague Conference].
5. Most intercountry adoptive families probably experience no significant legal problems,
at least on the U.S. side, in completing an adoption. On the other hand, the lack of clear law
presents an ever-present risk even for completed adoptions. For example, the Attorney General
of the State of Georgia once declared that most, if not all, intercountry adoptions by families in
that state were void. Subsequent legislation cured the difficulties he had identified and retroac-
tively validated previous adoptions. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 357.
6. I use the term "sending nation" interchangeably with "nation of origin" to mean a
child's original homeland in an intercountry adoption. While nation of origin is more awkward,
it is the term the Convention employs. A "receiving nation" is the child's destination and the
home nation of the adopters.
7. See Tamar Lewin, South Korea Slows Export of Babies for Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
12, 1990, at B10; Bart Eisenberg, Road to Foreign Adoptions Gets Rockier, CHRIMSAr SCIENCE
MONrrOR, Feb. 28, 1990, at 13.
In 1993, 7,348 foreign-born children arrived in the U.S. after or for the purpose of adoption.
See Peter Pfund, Intercountry Adoption: The 1993 Hague Convention-Its Purposes, Implemen-
tation and Promise, 28 FAM. L.Q. 53, 75 & n.41 (1994) (citing a pending statistical summary by
the Statistics Division of the U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service). In contrast, during the
mid-1980s the annual rate of such immigration exceeded 9,000 annually. See U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF TE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1992, at
373, table no. 599 (1992).
8. See, e.g., J.H.A. van Loon, Permanent Bureau, Report on Intercountry Adoption, The
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No. 1, at 84-94 (April 1990); Carol
Morello, Child-Snatching Rumors Panic Guatemalan Parents, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 17,
1994, at Al; William Long, Foreign Adoptions Are Being Curtailed in Many Latin American
Countries, Los ANGELES TIMES, Apr. 16,1994, at IA; Gabrielle Glaser, Booming Polish MarkeL
Blond, Blue Eyed Babies, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 19,1992, at 19; Kathleen Hunt, The Romanian Baby
Bazaar, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 1991, (Magazine), at 24.
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Some of the opposition to intercountry adoption is blindly nation-
alistic, oblivious to the interests of children, and armed with sensa-
tional exaggerations of the extent of illicit baby-selling operations.
There are also, however, justifiable grounds for reasonable concern in
sending nations. In some sending nations, customary safeguards may
be nonexistent, 9 and the international movement of children tends to
compound opportunities for corruption and circumvention of the law.
Even without these problems, sending nations deserve, and increas-
ingly want, assurance that their children are not cast into an unchan-
nelled stream of commerce but are guarded by law and competent
authorities.
The Hague Convention, which received the unanimous approval
of the delegations at the Conference, is the most likely means for al-
laying these concerns.' 0 The United States' ratification of the Con-
vention would fortify pro-adoption forces against their opposition in
sending nations. Our failure to ratify the Convention would probably
have the opposite effect.
This article will examine the Convention, its benefits and obliga-
tions, and the possible means for its implementation in the United
States. The starting point is a summary of the basic terms of the Con-
vention, with a special focus on the Convention's allocation of respon-
sibilities in the adoption process. That summary is followed by an
analysis of certain provisions likely to provoke the most controversy
in the U.S. These include the Convention's guarded endorsement of
intercountry adoption, its rule restricting direct contact between birth
families and prospective adopters, and its requirements for the regula-
tion of adoption agencies. The latter problem is especially controver-
sial because it requires the U.S. to choose from among a variety of
9. Even in the U.S. where safeguards exists they are not foolproof. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin,
Undelivered Adoptions Investigated in 3 States, NEw YORK TIMES, Mar. 22, 1992, at 16; cf. Linda
Eardley, Adoption Agency Is Accused, ST. Louis Posr-DIsPATcH, Nov. 30, 1990, at 11A.
10. At the conclusion of the Conference the participating states adopted the final act,
Those participating states were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China,
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela, member states of
the Hague Conference, and the invitee states of Albania, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulga-
ria, Burkina Faso, Columbia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Haiti, the Holy See, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Kenya, the Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nepal, Pan-
ama, Peru, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1139.
[Vol. 30:243
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regulatory schemes with different costs, regulatory burdens, and de-
grees of federal oversight of local authority. Finally, the article dis-
cusses an important problem that has received relatively little
attention: the effect of the Convention when the U.S. is a sending
nation.
II. BASIC TERMS OF THE CONVENTION
A. The Origins of the Convention
The Hague Conference's Convention is not the first international
law pertaining to adoption. However, it is the first to deal with global
intercountry adoption in a sigliificant way. Until recently intercountry
adoption seemed too transitory or peculiar and too varied in character
to deserve substantial effort at systemization.1 Thus, before the Con-
vention, international adoption law consisted of vague, hortatory dec-
larations of little practical value and bilateral or regional agreements
of limited scope. 2 By 1988, however, when The Hague Conference
proposed to draft an international adoption law, 3 it was clear that
intercountry adoption was not merely episodic but was a regular and
normal phenomena likely to continue in the indefinite future. More-
over, while causes and sources of intercountry adoption will doubtless
change from time to time, half a century of experience teaches a
number of inherent legal and practical problems that international law
can usefully address.
At the outset, The Hague Conference offered some special ad-
vantages as an organization for drafting intercountry adoption law.
While its earlier conventions relating to child custody and adoption
11. For the first three or four decades after World War II, intercountry adoption was driven
by particular crises from one world region to another, from the war in Europe, to the war in
Korea, to the war in Vietnam. See Richard R. Carlson, Transnational Adoption of Children, 23
TuLSA LJ. 317, 324-31 (1988). Today, the fall of Communism is a crisis contributing to the
growth and diversity of intercountry adoption. See Glaser, supra note 8; Hunt, supra note 8.
12. These agreements are summarized in J.H.A. van Loon, supra note 8, at 12-20.
13. At its 1988 session, The Hague Conference directed its Secretary General to initiate
work toward a "convention on adoption of children coming from abroad." van Loon, supra note
8, at 2-20. The Conference envisioned a "convention on international co-operation and protec-
tion of children in respect of intercountry adoption" to answer such questions as (1) when is
intercountry adoption appropriate; (2) what law should govern the different issues of adoption;
and (3) who should supervise the adoption, and how should they do so? Permanent Bureau,
Memorandum Concerning the Preparation of a New Convention on International Co-operation
and Protection of Children in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, The Hague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law, at 3 (Nov. 1989) [hereinafter Permanent Bureau Memo].
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were of limited practical value for the problems of contemporary in-
tercountry adoption,'14 they provided a minimum foundation of expe-
rience. Further, since The Hague is dedicated to private international
law, it is particularly suited to accommodate diverse national legal sys-
tems to international transactions between private individuals. The
Hague Conference's limited membership and commitment also give it
a more focused and easily managed agenda than international organi-
zations with broader memberships and mandates, such as the United
Nations.
The Hague Conference's limited membership was also a potential
disadvantage. Its members include mainly western developed nations,
generally the world's receiving nations, plus a handful of less devel-
oped nations and non-western nations.. Most important sending na-
tions, however, are not members of The Hague Conference. Thus, if
the Conference had confined its legislative process to the member-
ship, there would have been little effective representation for the in-
terests of sending nations. In any event, the envisioned convention
could not have accomplished its purpose if it lacked the assent of ma-
jor sending nations. For this reason, the Conference took the unusual
step of extending special invitations to many nonmember sending na-
tions.15 The resulting deliberative body of greater than sixty national
delegations represented all of the currently most important nations in
intercountry adoption. 6
B. The Scope of the Convention; The Exclusion of Refugees
The Convention applies when spouses or a single person17 of one
contracting state seeks to adopt a child 8 who is habitually resident in
14. Permanent Bureau Memo, supra note 13.
15. Letter from George Droz, Secretary General of The Hague Conference of Private In-
ternational Law, to National Organs of Member Nations and Invitees (Nov. 30, 1989); Perma-
nent Bureau Memo, supra note 13, at 1.
16. The participating nations are listed in the Preamble to the Final Act of the Seventeenth
Session. See list supra note 10. Korea first declined to participate in the proceedings, even
though it has served as the most important nation of origin for U.S. adopters. However, Korea
did ultimately join as an invitee to the Seventeenth Session at which the Conference adopted the
Convention. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1139.
17. One of the issues discussed during the proceedings was whether the Convention should
approve of adoption by single persons. The final version of the Convention contemplates that
there could be an adoption by a single parent. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1139 (art. 2).
However, each contracting state may decide for itself whether a single parent is qualified to
adopt.
18. The Convention would apply only to the adoption of a child under eighteen years of
age. If a child becomes eighteen before the respective central authorities make an Article 17
agreement to the adoption, the Convention would cease to apply. See Hague Conference, supra
[Vol. 30:243
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another contracting state. Depending on which and how many na-
tions become contracting states, the Convention could apply to very
many intercountry adoptions or to none at all. Fortunately, nearly all
major sending and receiving nations participated in the drafting of the
Convention.19 Contracting status is not guaranteed for any of these
nations, but the Convention's many compromises reflect the Confer-
ence's substantial effort to write an agreement attractive to as wide a
circle of nations as reasonably possible.
Of course, the Convention will not apply to any adoptions by
U.S. residents unless the U.S. becomes a contracting nation. Even
then it will apply only if the other nation in the adoption process is
also a contracting nation. However, if other sending and receiving na-
tions become contracting states, the U.S. will have much to lose by
rejecting the Convention. Contracting sending nations are very likely
to give preference to other contracting nations in adoption place-
ments. It is even possible that some sending nations will prohibit child
placement except in other contracting nations.
The Convention does not apply to refugees or internationally dis-
placed children who are not habitually resident in a contracting na-
tion. The Conference initially determined that intercountry
placement rules for such children might be a suitable topic for the
Convention. On consideration, however, it decided that refugee chil-
dren present a separate and more complicated problem requiring a
very different approach.20 For the present, The Hague Conference
has directed its Secretary General to consult with the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees for the purpose of exploring the desirability of
further action regarding refugee children.2'
The exclusion of refugee children from the scope of the Conven-
tion will not prevent the intercountry placement of such children.
Refugee children will continue to be subject to intercountry adoption
to the extent permissible under current law. Although such adoptions
are often subject to the approval of other international institutions
such as the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, they lack the ben-
efit of the rules created by the Convention.
note 4, at 1139 (art. 3). However, the nonapplicability of the Convention would not, in itself,
prohibit the completion of the adoption.
19. Two exceptions were Paraguay and Guatemala. See list supra note 10.
20. The most obvious complicating factor is that the adoptability of refugee children is
chronically uncertain. Conditions created by any given refugee crisis are likely to thwart the
collection of reliable documentation about a child's origin.
21. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1144 (art. 42).
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C. Basic Terms: Procedure, Choice of Law, and Recognition
1. The Need for New Rules
Intercountry adoption is increasingly subject to attack. This is
particularly true in sending nations due to the lack of any clear expres-
sion of legitimacy and the absence of effective legal or institutional
restraints against perceived abuses by adopters and adoption agencies.
Before the Convention, one could plausibly argue that many in-
tercountry adoptions were in violation of certain United Nations proc-
lamations,' which some had interpreted to prohibit intercountry
adoption of a child when a local placement alternative existed, includ-
ing, perhaps, institutionalization. International law was tepid, at best,
in endorsing intercountry adoption in any situation, and it imposed no
duty on local officials to cooperate in or facilitate a child's placement
in intercountry adoptionP3
The absence of a workable intercountry adoption law in the U.S.
has presented another set of problems. Existing adoption laws take
little account of the special problems of intercountry adoption. For
example, if the adoption of a foreign-born child is to occur in a state
court, state laws may still impose the same requirements as would ap-
ply to the adoption of a U.S. born child. For example, state law may
require the court to make its own determination of the child's adopta-
bility, even though foreign authorities have already freed the child for
adoption, and the U.S. court is without any reasonably practical
means of interpreting foreign law or investigating the child's circum-
stances.24 Moreover, state laws typically have very strict and often
unique requirements regarding the procedure and form for a birth
mother's relinquishment of her child for adoption, or for notification
and relinquishment by a birth father. It is questionable whether a for-
eign relinquishment should or would satisfy state law.-5
Similar problems have complicated the readoption technique, a
process in which a child is adopted by decree of a foreign court, and a
U.S. state court subsequently confirms the adoption by its own de-
cree.26 A few states have adopted special intercountry adoption laws
for either type of intercountry adoption, but these laws are often
22. See infra, notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
23. See infra, notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
24. See, eg., N.Y. DoM. REL LAw § 115-a (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994).
25. See generally Richard R. Carlson, Transnational Adoption of Children, 23 TULSA L.J.
317, 345-71 (1988).
26. Readoption is especially important when the nation of origin recognizes and grants only
.,simple" adoptions which resemble a grant of custody without terminating a child's relationship
[Vol. 30:243
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designed on an ad hoc basis to deal with a particular type of problem
or crisis, or they are tailored to the procedures of particular sending
countries, such as Korea.' This ad hoc approach is no match for the
ever-changing causes, directions, and character of intercountry
adoption.
While most intercountry adoption proceedings in the U.S. result
in final adoption decrees likely entitled to full faith and credit
throughout the U.S., pre-Convention international law offers no guar-
antee that other nations must recognize the legitimacy of the adop-
tions. The absence of clear rules of recognition has presented at least
some risk that foreign authorities would choose to disregard an adop-
tion in an issue of custody, property rights, or rights of survivorship.28
2. The Convention's Solution
Insofar as its effect in sending nations, the Convention's most im-
portant features may be the endorsement of intercountry adoption
and establishment of duties to cooperate, facilitate, and expedite in-
tercountry adoption. These aspects of the Convention are discussed
at greater length below.2 9
To resolve procedural problems in intercountry adoption, the
Convention offers a logical allocation of responsibility between na-
tions of origin and receiving nations. The basic allocation is the same
whether the adopters obtain an adoption decree in the receiving na-
tion or in the state of origin with readoption in the receiving nation.
The institutions or persons that actually perform functions under
the Convention will naturally vary according to local law and condi-
tions. Most importantly, the Convention rejects a proposal, once
widely favored by other nations, that only public authorities should be
involved in the adoption process.3° The U.S. might have found that
proposal impossible to accept because private agencies and profes-
sionals are presently involved in most intercountry adoptions involv-
ing the U.S. The final version of the Convention preserves the
essential role of these private agencies.
with its birth parents. while readoption in the U.S. might be less important in other situations,
there are and will continue to be practical advantages to readoption. See id. at 352-53.
27. Id. at 366-71.
28. For an example of a U.S. court refusing to recognize a foreign adoption decree, see
Doulgeris v. Bambacus, 127 S.E.2d 145, 149 (Va. 1962).
29. See infra, notes 44-53, 68-89 and accompanying text.
30. Peter Pfund, Briefing Paper 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, at 3
(June 1993) (copy on file with author).
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Appendix A is a list of tasks under the Convention and the types
of parties that can or must perform them. TWo key tasks worthy of
further discussion are first, determining a child's adoptability and sec-
ond, determining the adopters' suitability to adopt.
The Convention allocates to the nation of origin the responsibil-
ity for determining a child's adoptability.31 Thus, that nation's law
and the decision of its competent authorities should fully resolve the
question of adoptability with no need for reexamination in the receiv-
ing nation. The Convention is necessarily vague about who is a com-
petent authority, a matter which could vary considerably from one
nation to another depending on local law and practice. In the U.S., a
competent authority would likely be a state court that terminates a
child's relationship with its birth parents and frees the child for
adoption.
The assignment of the task of determining adoptability to the na-
tion of origin is especially important to the future of intercountry
adoption practice in the U.S. as a receiving nation. State legislatures
and courts have sometimes resisted the notion that they should rely on
the conclusions of a foreign magistrate. The Convention, by virtue of
federal supremacy, would preempt a state court's discretion to recon-
sider the adoptability issue. The Convention, however, also attacks
some of the underlying concerns a U.S. court might have about a for-
eign authority's adoptability determination. Although the Conven-
tion does not seek to transplant the most rigorous U.S. requirements
for adoptability into international law, it does establish important
minimum standards for adoptability. Thus, nation of origin authori-
ties must determine, among other things, that any person responsible
for the child has freely given an informed, counselled, and written
consent conforming to local law, and that the consent was not induced
by payment or other compensation.32 A birth mother's consent is
valid only if she gave the consent after the child's birth.33 Central
Authorities designated by each contracting state will identify the cor-
rect institutions for determining a child's adoptability,34 confirm the
chiid's adoptability, and monitor compliance with the Convention.35
31. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1139, 1141 (art. 4, 16).
32. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 4(c)).
33. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 4(c)). With due "regard to the age and
degree of maturity of the child," nation of origin authorities sometimes must also ensure the
consent of the child according to a similar set of requirements. Hague Conference, supra note 4,
at 1140 (art. 4(d)).
34. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 6).
35. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1141 (art. 16).
[Vol. 30:243
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A further safeguard is a rule restricting pre-placement direct contacts
between adopters and birth parents, a matter discussed in greater
depth below. 36
A second key task, investigating the prospective adopters' suita-
bility to adopt, is the responsibility of the competent authorities of the
receiving nation.37 Again, the Convention is necessarily vague about
who would be a competent authority for this task. Where the U.S. is
the receiving nation, the suitability determination will likely be in ac-
cordance with current practice. Thus, U.S. adopters would obtain a
homestudy approved by an accredited agency or qualified professional
in the U.S.3 8  The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, in
concert with state social welfare authorities, would review the adopt-
ers' application and homestudy to confirm that the homestudy is
favorable and that the adopters fulfill the essential statutory qualifica-
tions of the adopters' home state. A state court would have the final
authority to approve the adopters' suitability when it finalizes the
adoption.3 9
Authorities in the nation of origin will continue to have some par-
ticipation in the decision as to whether adopters are suitable for a par-
ticular placement because designated authorities for both nations
must actually approve an adoptive placement.' In other words, an
adopter's favorable U.S. homestudy will be no guarantee that foreign
authorities must approve an adoptive placement for that adopter. As
36. See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
37. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 114041 (art. 5, 14, 15).
38. For a discussion of the accreditation process, see infra notes 109-156 and accompanying
text.
39. There is a potential difficulty in the allocation of this task to the competent authorities
of the U.S. receiving state. The Convention envisions that competent authorities will determine
the adopters' suitability before there is any direct contact between the child and adopters, and
before the transfer of custody or emigration of the child. See Hague Conference, supra note 4, at
1141.43 (art. 17, 19, 29). Under U.S. law, however, a state court is ultimately responsible for this
determination at the time it grants the adoption, regardless of whether the state court grants the
initial adoption or a readoption. Thus, under current practice and under the Convention, there
is the possibility a court could thwart an adoption by rejecting the adopters' suitability at the
very last stage. The risk of such an event is probably small, but it causes some agencies to select
their venue to avoid judges who are hostile to interracial or intercountry adoption.
One solution to this problem would be a pre-placement judicial determination of suitability
by a procedure now available in New York. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-a (McKinney 1988
& Supp. 1994). The court's task after the placement could be limited to reviewing the success of
a pre-adoption trial custody period, or considering newly discovered evidence concerning the
adopters' suitability.
40. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1141 (art. 16, 17, 19).
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is presently true, some nations may prohibit or disfavor certain place-
ments based on the comparative age of the parties, marital status, reli-
gion, or other factors. Under the Convention, however, the nation of
origin authorities may be less likely to engage in their own wide-rang-
ing consideration of the details of the adopters' circumstances. For
example, the Convention may be useful in dissuading a nation of ori-
gin from requiring adopters to spend a lengthy period of time in that
nation pending local investigation of the adopters' suitability.
The same allocation of responsibilities will apply whether the
adoption decree is issued by a nation of origin court or by a receiving
nation court. In either event, an adoption decree "certified . . . as
having been made in accordance with the Convention" will enjoy the
recognition of all contracting states.4' The most important exception
to this rule is for so-called simple adoptions, which resemble a mere
grant of custody and do not terminate the birth parent-child relation-
ship. 42 However, the Convention provides that if a simple adoption is
accompanied by consents satisfying the minimum requirements for re-
linquishment, the receiving nation may convert the simple adoption
into a full adoption, and the new adoption decree will be entitled to all
the benefits of recognition under the Convention.43
41. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1142 (art. 23).
42. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1142 (art. 26, 27).
43. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1142 (art. 26, 27). The conversion of a simple adop-
tion into a full adoption involves much more than a U.S. court's confirmation of the adoptive
family relationship. Because simple adoption does not completely terminate the birth parents'
relationship with the child, there is some danger that conversion to a full adoption will upset the
parties' original expectations. However, under Article 27, such a conversion is proper only if
"the consents referred to in Article 4, subparagraphs c and d, have been or are given for the
purpose of such an adoption." Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1142 (art. 26, 27). Further,
Article 4 provides that the party giving consent must have received counsel as to the "effects of
their consent" and "whether or not an adoption will result in the termination of the legal rela-
tionship between the child and his or her family of origin." Hague Conference, supra note 4, at
1139 (art. 4). It will be the responsibility of authorities in the nation of origin, and not a U.S.
court, to determine whether these requirements are satisfied. See Hague Conference, supra note
4, at 1139-41 (art. 4, 16). However, it will be necessary for the U.S. to authorize the readoption
procedure in its implementing legislation. See Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1142 (art.
27(a)).
It would be more straightforward to provide for a full adoption in the state of origin, but full
adoption remains alien to the law and culture of many nations. While the Convention's quick fix
solution is less than perfect, it does constitute an improvement over the present legal vacuum in
which many U.S. adopters readopt children in the U.S. without any thought of whether the
original adoption was full or simple.
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 30 [1994], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol30/iss2/1
1994] HAGUE CONFERENCE ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 255
III. CONTROVERSIAL PROVISIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR
THE UNITED STATES
A. The Overall Impact of the Convention on Adoption
1. Will the Convention Require a Ponderous Bureaucracy?
Perhaps the most frequent question about the Convention is
whether its effect will be to discourage or impede intercountry adop-
tions by creating additional rules and bureaucracy. As the preceding
discussion of basic terms reveals, the heart of the Convention is not a
new layer of regulations or institutions but a clearer identification of
authority and responsibility in determining a child's adoptability, the
adopters' qualifications, and the suitability of the placement. The new
central authorities described in the Convention likely serve mainly to
monitor procedural problems, encourage cooperation, and advise
other actors in the adoption process. In a private agency adoption
most of the procedural tasks described by the Convention will still be
performed by the agency or by existing public authorities, such as the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the state courts,
much as these tasks are performed today.' Only in independent
adoptions will state or federal central authorities make important de-
cisions or grant approvals that otherwise would be made by private
agencies, but even in this regard the government's involvement will be
a relatively slight extension of the existing activity of the INS and
many state welfare authorities. 45
2. The Endorsement of Intercountry Adoption
a. When Should Intercountry Adoption Occur?
Another answer to the question about the overall effect of the
Convention is that this new law constitutes the first authoritative dec-
laration of the virtue of intercountry adoption and the need for expe-
ditious support and cooperation by signatory nations. A common
criticism in the U.S. is that the Convention is not bold enough in en-
couraging intercountry adoption. However, to say that the Conven-
tion merely tilts in favor of intercountry adoption is to understate the
importance of the Convention's gains.
44. See Appendix A.
45. Id
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The pro-adoption tone in the Convention was far from inevitable
when The Hague first embarked on the project. One of the most po-
tentially divisive issues at the outset was whether the Conference
should propose a set of rules for determining when intercountry adop-
tion is appropriate for a child.46 Underlying this issue was a difference
in perspective that affected the drafting of many articles of the
Convention.
In general there were two camps. Receiving nations such as the
United States47 tended to be most eager to endorse intercountry
adoption and facilitate the adoption process.48 On the other side were
those participants and observers who believed the Convention should
be primarily restrictive: to eliminate abuses such as baby-selling; to
protect a child's right to grow up in the land of its birth, or a nation's
right to prevent the loss of its natural resources - children - to other
nations; and with the possible effect of reducing intercountry adop-
tion. Nations of origin were especially prone to skepticism or embar-
rassment 49 about a phenomena frequently mischaracterized by the
46. The United Nations approved "the best interests of the child" standard for adoptive or
foster placement of children. Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protec-
tion and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally
and Internationally, G.A. Res. 41/85, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Annex, at art. 5 (1986), reprinted in
26 I.L.M. 1096 (1987); Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 61st
plen. mtg., Annex, at art. 21 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1148 (1989), with corrections at 29
I.L.M. 1340 (1990).
47. In fact, the United States is also a sending state because an undetermined number of
children are sent from the U.S. to other countries for adoption each year. There does not appear
to be any reliable information on the number of such intercountry adoptions out of the United
States. However, one estimate puts the number at "a few hundred" every year. Special Com-
mission on Intercountry Adoption, Report of Meeting, The Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law, Doc. No. 17, at 3 (Apr. 24, 1991).
Nevertheless, even as a sending state, the U.S. delegation and observers argued that in-
tercountry placement was often in the best interests of American children, and that an absolute
preference for local placement, especially if it favored institutionalization, would undermine the
interests of many children. See Gloria F. DeHart, Report, Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law: Special Commission on Intercountry Adoption, 3 (June 6, 1991) (submitted to
ABA Section for Family Law).
48. Peter Pfund, Memorandum: Proposed Agenda for Meeting of Study Group on In-
tercountry Adoption at 2 (Jan. 9, 1992).
It would be a gross simplification to say that the U.S. has wholeheartedly embraced in-
tercountry adoption. Because intercountry adoption is nearly always interracial or at least inter-
ethnic, the wider public's reception to intercountry adoption has been mixed. See Elizabeth
Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U.
PA. L. Rnv. 1163, 1174-82 (1991).
49. See Pfund, supra note 48; Peter Pfund, Memorandum to Members of Study Group on
Intercountry Adoption (Mar. 4, 1992) (on file with author); see also Ahlilemah Jonet, Interna-
tional Baby Selling for Adoption, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 7
N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. Rrs. 82 (1989).
However, there were also some receiving nations in this camp. See DeHart, supra note 47.
[Vol. 30:243
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media as exporting babies, 0 and their suspicions were fed by concur-
rent crises and scandals of baby selling in former Communist and
lesser developed countries.51
As a practical matter, the goals of regulating and facilitating in-
tercountry adoption need not be incompatible. Facilitating lawful
adoption is one likely way of reducing the temptation for illicit activ-
ity. Well-crafted regulation could increase confidence in the system
and thus promote intercountry adoption. Nevertheless, differences in
perspective were especially troublesome because they touched emo-
tional issues of child welfare and national interests, and because they
tended to divide the participants roughly into nonmember sending na-
tions invited to the Conference,52 and receiving nations that were
members of the Conference.53
The difference in perspective was especially evident in debate
over the relative rank of intercountry adoption in comparison with
other methods of caring for children. The debate was essentially over
the question when there should be intercountry placement, and repre-
sented an effort by different groups to generalize about a child's best
interests when the child has no family but there are local alternatives
to intercountry placement. For example, if an infant could be placed
in a suitable family by intercountry adoption or placed in a local or-
phanage, most child welfare experts would probably agree that in-
tercountry adoption would be in the child's best interests.
50. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, South Korea Slows Export of Babies for Adoption, N.Y. TiMES,
Feb. 12, 1990 at B10; Gabrielle Glaser, Booming Polish Market Blond, Blue Eyed Babies, N.Y.
Tims, Apr. 19, 1992 at A8.
51. See, e.g., Peter Pfund, Memorandum to Members of the Study Group on Intercountry
Adoption, 2-3 (Mar. 4, 1992) (on file with the author); Carol Morello, Child-Snatching Rumors
Panic Guatemalan Parents, ORLANDo SENINEL, Apr. 17, 1994, at Al; William Long, Foreign
Adoptions Are Being Curtailed in Many Latin American Countries, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16,1994, at
Al; Eugene Robinson, In Peru, Anxieties Over Adoption; Some Accused of Baby Selling to Ex-
ploit American Market, WAsH. PosT, Mar. 8, 1992, at Al; Kathleen Hunt, The Romanian Baby
Bazaar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,1991, (Magazine), at 24; Mark Uhlig, Down the Years, Father Hunts
His Stolen Son, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 23, 1991, at A4 (describing alleged baby-selling in Mexico).
52. During the 1980s there were approximately 170,000 to 180,000 intercountry adoptions
around the world. In about 90 percent of these cases, the sending nations were Korea, India,
Columbia, Brazil, Sri Lanka, Chile, the Philippines, Guatemala, Peru, and El Salvador. Special
Commission on Intercountry Adoption, Report of Meeting, The Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Doc. No. 24, at 3 (Apr. 29, 1991).
53. See list of participating nations cited supra note 10.
In about 85 percent of intercountry adoptions, the receiving states are the United States,
France, Sweden, Holland, Italy and Switzerland. Special Commission on Intercountry Adoption,
Report of Meeting, The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Doc. No. 24, at 3 (Apr.
29, 1991). By one estimate, the U.S. accounts for about one-third of all intercountry adoptions.
Peter Pfund, Intercountry Adoption: The 1993 Hague Convention: Its Purposes, Implementation
and Promise, 28 FAM. L.Q. 53, 75 (1994).
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Naturally, there is risk in any attempt to generalize about chil-
dren's best interests. Every child and his situation are unique. A
statement that intercountry adoption is better than in-country institu-
tionalization can only be a generalization. There may be some chil-
dren for whom intercountry adoption is inadvisable. Older children
who have acquired a deep sense of cultural and community identity
might be poorly suited for intercountry adoption. For such children,
institutionalization or other local alternatives, such as foster care or
some other variant, might be the preferred method of care.
One could argue that the international legal community should
not even attempt to legislate specific rules for setting the priority be-
tween local institutionalization, local foster care, local adoption, and
intercountry adoption, and that each child's placement must be an in-
dividualized decision based on a flexible and open-ended considera-
tion of that child's best interests. Nevertheless, when The Hague
began its work toward a new Convention, it confronted a fait accom-
pli. The United Nations had already adopted a rule for intercountry
adoption. The U.N.'s approach to the problem was not one The
Hague could ignore.
b. The United Nation's Rule
The U.N. General Assembly's most important statements regard-
ing intercountry adoption are contained in a 1987 Declaration on So-
cial and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of
Children, 4 and a 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.55
While these documents made some progress in favor of adoption in
general, they were either inconclusive or restrictive, depending on in-
terpretation, in their attitude toward intercountry adoption.
,54. Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of
Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internation-
ally, G.A. Res. 41/85, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess. (1986), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1096 (1987) [herein-
after U.N. Declaration].
55. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 61st plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. a/44/25 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1148 (1989), with corrections at 29 I.L.M. 1340
(1990) [hereinafter U.N. Convention].
[Vol. 30:243
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The U.N.'s pronouncements were most favorable in stating a gen-
eral preference for adoptive or other family placement over institu-
tional placement. 6 Under the U.N. Declaration and Convention, care
by an institution is appropriate only if necessary for a child's care.5 7
A more controversial matter has been the rank of intercountry
adoption in this system of preferences. Not surprisingly, the U.N.
Resolution and Declaration state a preference for placement in a
child's birth land versus placement in another country. Article 17 of
the Declaration provides "if a child cannot be placed in a foster or an
adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the
country of origin, intercountry adoption may be considered as an al-
ternative means of providing the child with a family." Article 21 of
the U.N. Convention also adopts this principle with comparable
language. 8
This order of preference probably would not have engendered
serious controversy if the choice were simply between intercountry
adoptive placement and adoptive placement in a child's birth nation.59
A general preference for local adoption probably reflects the interests
56. Under the U.N. Declaration and U.N. Convention, family care includes adoption, foster
care, or the Moslem concept kafalah. Kafalah is an Islamic concept that is similar to American
foster care. Patricia Price Cohen, Introductory Note, United Nations: Convention on the Rights
of the Child, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1451 (1989); Ahlilemah Jonet, International Baby Selling for Adop-
tion, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 7 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. Rrs.
82, 87-88 (1989).
Neither document recognizes any particular superiority of full adoption over other types of
family placement (such as foster family placement), because not all member nations had or were
prepared to create laws or systems for adoption. Thus, for example, Article 20 of the U.N. Con-
vention includes among appropriate methods of care foster placement and kafalah, as well as
adoption. U.N. Convention, supra note 55, Annex at art. 20. Article 21's principles for adoption
apply only to those nations "that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption .... " U.N.
Convention, supra note 55, Annex at art. 21.
57. U.N. Declaration, supra note 54, Annex at art. 4, 20.
58. The U.N. Convention states "inter-country adoption may be considered as an alterna-
tive means of child's care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or
cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the child's country of origin." U.N. Convention,
supra note 55, Annex at art. 21.
59. Even this statement of preference would be troubling if it prevented a child's adoption
by close relations in another country. For example, would the U.N.'s approach prevent adoption
by an aunt or uncle who happened to live in a different country? However, Article 20 of the
U.N. Convention, read in conjunction with other provisions, suggests it was not intended to
apply to such choices. Article 20 describes adoption as "alternative care" for a child "perma-
nently deprived of his or her family environment." U.N. Convention, supra note 55, Annex at
art. 20. Other provisions of the U.N. Convention suggest that family environment connotes ex-
tended family. See also U.N. Declaration, supra note 54, Annex at art. 5 ("States Parties shall
respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the members of the
extended family .... "); U.N. Declaration, supra note 54, Annex at art. 8 ("States Parties shall
undertake the right of the child to preserve his or her... family relations .... ).
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or inclination of most nations including the U.S., regardless of interna-
tional law. After all, intercountry adoption occurs on a large scale
only when a nation of origin lacks a sufficient number of prospective
adoptive parents to provide for all its adoptable children. If a nation
has a sufficient number of prospective adoptive families, and espe-
cially if it has an abundance, it is likely to prefer internal placement in
order to favor its own residents who wish to adopt, to prevent domes-
tic controversy, and to strengthen and extend the power of local au-
thorities to supervise child placement.60
The troubling aspect of the U.N.'s rule is that it favors foster care
and possibly even suitable institutionalization over intercountry adop-
tive placement.6' While a preference for local foster care might seem
innocuous at first blush, the concept of foster care covers a very wide
range of placement conditions even in countries such as the U.S.62 In
some other countries it may be the equivalent of involuntary
servitude.63
A general preference for local institutionalization would be even
more clearly misplaced, but the U.N. documents could be interpreted
to include such a preference. The Declaration provides that in-
tercountry adoption may be considered only if a child "cannot in any
suitable manner be cared for in the country of origin," 64 and the U.N.
Convention tracks this language.65 Could institutionalization be a
suitable means of care? If so, some nations might be persuaded to
discourage intercountry placement even for a child with little or no
60. The recent decline in Korean intercountry placements exemplifies this tendency. Tamar
Lewin, South Korea Slows Export of Babies for Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1990 at B10.
61. Jonet, supra note 56, at 93.
62. Some commentators have recently suggested that foster care in the U.S. is often worse
than institutionalization. See Joyce Ladner, Bring Back the Orphanages; They're Better for Kids
Than Addicted Parents and Heartless Foster Care, WASH. POsr, Oct. 29, 1989, (Outlook), at 1.
63. Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Current Status and Future Prospects, 3 THE
FuT-uRr OF CHILDREN 89, 97 (1993). Even in the U.S. there has been some history of foster
placement as a system of cheap labor. See Hugh Dellios, Riders of the Orphan Trains Finally
End Their Silence, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 4, 1993, (Tempo), at 1 (describing the orphan trains that
continued until the 1920s as a means for quickly placing large numbers of New York children
among families in the Midwest); Thomas Morgan, Orphans Return to City They Left on Sad
Trains, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1990 at B3.
64. Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of
Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internation-
ally, G.A. Res. 41/85, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Annex, art. 17 (1986), reprinted in 26 IL.M. 1096
(1987) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration].
65. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 61st plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. a/44/25, Annex, art. 21 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1148 (1989), with corrections at
29 I.L.M. 1340 (1990).
[Vol. 30:243
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other hope of local adoptive or foster placement.66 Indeed, opponents
of intercountry adoption have frequently asserted the U.N.'s vague
rule as support for their arguments against intercountry adoption.67
c. The Hague's Approach
When The Hague Conference's Special Commission on In-
tercountry Adoption convened in 1990 to draft preliminary Conclu-
sionS68 for the Convention, there was wide agreement that the
Convention must deal in some fashion with the U.N. position,69
although there was much less agreement regarding the merit or actual
location of the U.N.'s position. Some argued that The Hague Conven-
tion should implement a restrictive version of the U.N.'s preference
for local placement,70 while others contended that the U.N.'s effort to
prioritize methods of placement was not practical as a statement of
law and deserved no more than a reference out of respect for the
66. See also Special Commission on Intercountry Adoption, Report of Meeting, The Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Doc. No. 29, at I (Apr. 30, 1991) (reporting the com-
ments of a representative of the U.N. High Commission on Refugees describing that organiza-
tion's traditional regard of intercountry adoption as a last resort for refugee orphans).
An alternative interpretation is that the U.N. Declaration's preference for family placement
would override the country of origin preference if family placement were not possible in the
country of origin. See U.N. Declaration, supra note 64, Annex, at art. 4. According to this
interpretation, institutionalization is never suitable except as the last resort.
Finally, it may be that the U.N. failed to resolve the order of preference between institution-
alization and intercountry adoption, recognizing that no set of generalizations about child place-
ment can serve the best interests of every child. A multitude of variable factors, such as the age
of a child, often affect what is best for a child. For example, institutional care might be prefera-
ble to intercountry adoption for an older child, especially if the child has substantially matured in
a particular locale and culture, and depending on the degree of local stigmatization, for persons
without families. On the other hand, infants and very young children are much more likely to
receive better care from a qualified adoptive family elsewhere than from a local institution. For
infants and very young children, institutionalization is probably never suitable except as the last
resort.
67. See Peter Pfund, Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Third Session of the Special
Commission on Intercountry Adoption of The Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Feb. 3-14, 1992, at 2-3; see also J.H.A. van Loon, Permanent Bureau, Report on Intercountry
Adoption, The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No. 1, at 96 (April
1990).
Intercountry adoption has been a frequent issue of local politics in sending nations. See
Richard R. Carlson, Transnational Adoption of Children, 23 TULSA LJ. 317, 334 n.99 (1988);
Gabrielle Glaser, Booming Polish MarkeL Blond, Blue Eyed Babies, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 19, 1992,
at 19.
68. Permanent Bureau, Conclusions of the Special Commission of June 1990 on Intercountry
Adoption, The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No. 3 (Aug. 1990).
69. Id., at art. I, 5, art. II, 9. See also Special Commission on Intercountry Adoption,
Report of Meeting, The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Doc. No. 18, at 2 (Apr.
23, 1991).
70. See Pfund, supra note 67 (describing the position of Defense of Children International
at the Hague).
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U.N.7 Still others, especially among U.S. delegates and observers,
sought a more positive statement in favor of intercountry adoption. 72
That the Convention ultimately restated placement choices in new
terms favorable to intercountry adoption was pleasantly surprising.
Initial efforts toward such a restatement had seemed to encounter
much resistance. The Hague's Special Commission, appointed to cre-
ate an agenda for the Convention, first proposed a half-modification,
placing intercountry adoption ahead of institutionalization but behind
foster care.73 The Permanent Bureau's subsequent illustrative draft
articles74 seemed to go further, placing intercountry adoption ahead of
both institutionalization and foster care.75 However, as the Special
Commission moved from preliminary observations and conclusions to
more detailed preliminary drafts, it took a more cautious approach,
perhaps out of concern that some sending nations would not agree to
71. Special Commission on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 69; Special Commission on
Intercountry Adoption, Report of Meeting, The Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Doc. No. 19, at 2 (Apr. 24, 1991); Special Commission on Intercountry Adoption, Report of
Meeting, The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Doc. No. 28, at 2 (May 3, 1991).
72. See Gloria F. DeHart, Report, Hague Conference on Private International Law: Special
Commission on Intercountry Adoption, 3 (June 6, 1991) (submitted to the ABA Section for
Family Law); see also Special Commission on Intercountry Adoption, Observations and Propos-
als Submitted by the Representatives of the International Bar Association, The Hague Conference
on Private International Law, Working Doc. No. 65, at 1 (Apr. 24,1991); Special Commission on
Intercountry Adoption, Document Submitted by the Delegation of Ireland, The Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law, Working Doc. No. 27, at 1 (Apr. 24, 1991).
73. "[A] child's best interests are in general best served if the child is raised by his or her
own parents or, alternatively, by a foster or adoptive family in the child's own country; in-
tercountry adoption is to be seen as a solution of a subsidiary nature for ensuring the welfare of
the child." Permanent Bureau, Conclusions of the Special Commission of June 1990 on In.
tercountry Adoption, The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No. 3, at
13 (Aug. 1990).
The Special Commission observed that adoption between relatives was a special problem
which "will merit closer study." Id. at 23. See also Special Commission on Intercountry Adop-
tion, Report of Meeting, The Hague Conference on Private International Law, No. 32, at 2 (May
3, 1991).
74. Permanent Bureau, Illustrative Draft Articles for a Convention on the Protection of Chil-
dren and on International Co-operation in Respect of intercountry Adoption, The Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No. 4 (Dec. 1990).
75. Id. at 7. The Illustrative Draft Articles would have permitted intercountry adoption if
"the competent authorities of the State of origin ... determined that no suitable alternative
exist[ed] for the adoption or the placement for purposes of adoption in the State of origin." Id.
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language appearing to promote a greater role for intercountry adop-
tion.76 Thus, the Special Commission's 1991 Final Working Docu-
ment77 and the Drafting Committee's Tentative Draft Convention7"
deleted much of the earlier pro-adoption language, and substituted
the U.N.'s original, vague statements regarding intercountry adop-
tion.79 The Tentative Draft also deleted any mention of "facilitating"
the adoption process among the purposes and goals of the
Convention. 0
This shift in approach in The Hague alarmed the U.S. delegation
and many U.S. observers, some of whom questioned whether the U.S.
could agree to a Convention that perpetuated the U.N.'s potentially
pernicious attitude toward intercountry adoption." In subsequent ne-
gotiations, the U.S. delegation worked to restore the more favorable
language and to gain a pro-adoption perspective.
That these efforts eventually succeeded is probably a reflection of
the Conference's major non-legislative achievement in restoring a
76. For example, beginning with the Illustrative Draft Articles, the drafters emphasized the
need for safeguards and omitted any mention of facilitating the process. Id.; see also Peter
Pfund, Memorandum: Proposed Agenda for Meeting of Study Group on Intercountry Adoption
at 2 (Jan. 9, 1992).
77. Special Commission on Intercountry Adoption, Final Working Document: Draft Articles
of a Convention on International Co-operation and Protection of Children in Respect of In-
tercountry Adoption, The Hague Conference on Private International Law (May 3 1991) [herein-
after Final Working Document].
78. Permanent Bureau, Tentative Draft Convention on International Co-Operation and Pro-
tection of Children in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, The Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law, Prel. Doc. No. 6 (Sept. 1991) [hereinafter Tentative Draft].
79. The Preamble of the Final Working Document recited the U.N.'s approach, that "in-
tercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a child, where the child
cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for
in the child's country of origin." Final Working Document, supra note 77, at 2. Article 4, para-
graph b, of the Final Working Document was especially troubling, because it indicated that the
appropriate authorities might need to apply this statement of preference on an individualized
basis for every child as a condition for intercountry placement. Final Working Document, supra
note 77, at 3.
The Drafting Committee's Tentative Draft offered some evidence of a shift back toward a
family placement preference, but the preference, if intended, was not very clear. The Preamble
of the Tentative Draft began with an identical statement of preference for local placement. Ten-
tative Draft, supra note 78, at 7. However, a revised version Article 4, paragraph b would have
required only "due consideration" for "possibilities for placement of the child within the State of
origin," as a condition for intercountry placement. Tentative Draft, supra note 78, at 9.
80. Tentative Draft, supra note 78.
81. See Peter Pfund, Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Third Session of the Special
Commission on Intercountry Adoption of The Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Feb. 3-14, 1992; Gloria F. DeHart, Report, Hague Conference on Private International Law:
Special Commission on Intercountry Adoption, at 3 (June 6, 1991) (submitted to ABA Section
on Family Law); American Academy of Adoption Lawyers, Suggested Revisions: Tentative
Draft Convention on International Co-Operation and Protection of Children in Respect of In-
tercountry Adoption, at 1 (Dec. 17, 1991).
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sense of trust between nations of origin and receiving nations. The
Conference was not only an opportunity to develop confidence-build-
ing rules, it was also a forum for mutual education about the situation
of children without families and the virtues of adoption. The final ver-
sion now clearly favors intercountry adoption over all other alterna-
tives except in-country adoption, and it encourages a more favorable
and cooperative attitude toward intercountry adoption.8
Thus, the Convention's Preamble declares that a child "should
grow up in a family environment."83 Contracting nations should seek
this objective first by "appropriate measures to enable the child to
remain in the care of his or her family of origin."'  If preservation of
the family of origin is not possible or appropriate, and "a suitable fam-
ily cannot be found in his or her State of origin," then intercountry
adoption "may offer the advantage of a permanent family" for the
child.8 5
The final version of the Convention also rejects arguments that
preference for local placement should be absolute, by not requiring
local authorities to make exhaustive and time-consuming investiga-
tions of all local adoption alternatives before an intercountry adoption
is allowed. In choosing intercountry adoption, local authorities need
only give due consideration to the possibility of local placement. 6
Local adoption is to be preferred only if there is a suitable adoptive
family available in the child's country of origin.8 7 However, when in-
tercountry adoption is in the child's best interests, 8 the respective
contracting nations "shall... facilitate, follow and expedite proceed-
ings with a view to[ward] obtaining the adoption. '8 9
The latter statement, for the very first time in international law,
recognizes a duty to cooperate and eliminate undue delay in in-
tercountry adoptions. Together with the endorsement of intercountry
adoption, these provisions constitute a clear rebuttal of restrictive in-
terpretations of the earlier U.N. documents. While it would be diffi-
cult to predict the magnitude of the practical effect of these
82. See Peter Pfund, Intercountry Adoption: The 1993 Hague Convention: Its Purposes, Im-
plementation and Promise, 28 FAM. L.Q. 53, 56 (1994).
83. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1139.
84. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1139.
85. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1139. An effort to amend this language to re-estab-
lish an express preference for local foster care failed. Peter Pfund, Assistant Advisor for Private
International Law, U.S. State Department, Remarks at Study Group Meeting (Nov. 4, 1993).
86. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1139 (Article 4(b)).
87. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1139 (Preamble).
88. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1139 (Article 4(b)).
89. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (Article 9(b)).
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provisions, at the very least they may encourage a more liberal atti-
tude toward intercountry adoption in many current or potential send-
ing nations. Furthermore, they negate the international law-based
arguments of the opponents of adoption.
B. Independent Adoption and the No Contact Rule
U.S. observers also closely followed the issue of whether the Con-
vention should include a rule prohibiting direct contact between pro-
spective adoptive parents and prospective adoptive children or their
birth families. The issue of direct contact pertains principally to the
opportunity of prospective adoptive parents to act without an agency
as an intermediary, to travel overseas to locate an adoptable child, and
to deal directly with the child's birth parents or guardian for the relin-
quishment and adoption of the child. The continuing opportunity for
such independent adoptions has been important to many who fear
that intercountry agencies will arbitrarily or unfairly disqualify some
prospective adopters, charge excessive amounts for the cost of place-
ment servides, or neglect many children in need of families if agencies
are solely responsible for arranging adoptions.
On the other hand, a no contact rule is important to many nations
of origin and other adoption-interest groups that worry about the po-
tential for undue encouragement of relinquishment, illicit payments,
or other improprieties in direct dealings between adopters and birth
parents or guardians. 90 Many other nations also have a particularly
strong tradition of delegating the matching process exclusively to pub-
lic authorities or licensed agencies.91
The issue of a no direct contact rule has also been controversial
domestically in the U.S., even for purely domestic adoptions. State
legislatures have taken a variety of approaches to the problem. Many
90. Special Commission on Intercountry Adoption, Report of Meeting, The Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law, No. 17, at 1-2 (Apr. 23, 1991); Special Commission on In-
tercountry Adoption, Report of Meeting, The Hague Conference on Private International Law,
No. 24 (Apr. 29, 1991).
91. J.H.A. van Loon, Permanent Bureau, Report on Intercountry Adoption, The Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No. 1, at 70-74 (April 1990); Peter Pfund,
Briefing Paper: 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, at 3 (June, 1993) (copy on
file with the author); G. Parra Aranguren, Report of the Special Commission on Intercountry
Adoption, The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Doc. No. 7 (Sept.
1992), at 102, 124 (copy on file with the author).
23
Carlson: The Emerging Law of Introductory Adoptions: An Analysis of the Ha
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1994
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
state laws make it impractical for adopters to seek out adoptive chil-
dren without an agency within those states.' Nearly all states, how-
ever, permit a birth parent or birth relative to seek adopters without
the assistance of an agency.93 Moreover, an adopter residing in any
state can avoid local restrictions by seeking potentially adoptable chil-
dren in a state, such as Texas, where the law does not forbid such
searches.94
Resolving the issue of direct contacts was not essential to the cre-
ation of an international law of intercountry adoption. There is noth-
ing to prevent any nation from prohibiting such contacts by the
unilateral enactment of national law. But there are at least two possi-
ble reasons for incorporating a no direct contact rule in international
law: to establish a default rule that will apply in situations such as the
Romanian adoption crisis, when social or legal revolution render the
law uncertain, incomplete or ineffective; 95 and to bolster the effective-
ness of a sending nation's prohibition, by gaining a receiving nation's
commitment to enforce the rule against its own residents. Further-
more, including some restriction in the Convention might also have
been an important sign of good faith by receiving nations to sending
nations.
The Hague's final solution incorporates a compromise that re-
stricts direct contacts without wholly preventing or prohibiting parent-
initiated adoptions. As a result the rule probably does not change the
restrictions adoptive parents would face even without the Convention.
Article 29 states the rule as follows:
92. See also, JOAN HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACIcE § 3.04 to .05 (5th ed. 1993
& Supp. Sept. 1993). States that do not absolutely prohibit adoptive placement by unlicensed
intermediaries may nevertheless prohibit the collection or payment of any fee for unlicensed
placement services. On the other hand, when lawyers or other professionals provide both place-
ment services and non-placement professional services in the same transaction, it may be very
difficult to distinguish the placement portion of the fee from the professional services portion.
93. Id. at §§ 1-A.01 to .51, 3.02. During the 1980s, independent or non-agency placements
constituted nearly one-third of all domestic placements involving non-relatives. See, BUREAU OF
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 373,
table 599 (1992).
94. In Texas, for example, in-state and out-of-state adopters routinely appeal to birth
mothers or relatives by advertising in the classified advertising sections of Texas newspapers. A
recent issue of the Houston Post included the following advertisement in the Adoptions section:
As our parents did for us, we will provide your newborn infant with love, guidance,
security, a wonderful family life, and a good education. We are a happily married,
financially secure couple who can make this difficult time easier for you. Full-time
Mom will be at home with your child. We are willing to meet. Legal and confidential.
Medical/Legal Expenses paid.
HOUSTON POST, November 12, 1994, at D12.
95. See, for example, the experience in Romania as described in Kathleen Hunt, The
Romanian Baby Bazaar, N.Y. TImEs, Mar. 24, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
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There shall be no contact between the prospective adoptive parents
and the child's parents or any other person who has care of the child
until the requirements of Article 4, sub-paragraphs a to e [official
determination that the child is available for intercountry adoption],
and Article 5, sub-paragraph a [official determination that the pro-
spective adopters are eligible to adopt], have been met, unless the
adoption takes place within a family or unless the contact is in com-
pliance with the conditions established by the competent authority
of the State of origin. 6
The actual impact of Article 29 may prove to be very slight. By its
terms the rule depends on local law. Thus, to a certain extent Article
29 merely affirms the obvious: each nation can decide for itself
whether to permit direct contacts, and, if so, under what circum-
stances.97 With or without the Convention, many sending countries
may be expected to arrive at their own decision, superseding Article
29. For example, a nation could decide to permit direct contact with-
out any restrictions, thus nullifying Article 29 when that nation is the
prospective adoptive family's nation of origin.
If a nation has failed to legislate or decide in any regard concern-
ing direct contacts, the Convention might prohibit direct contacts ex-
cept those in accordance with Article 29. Many nations may also be
persuaded to view Article 29 as the endorsed standard, and choose to
purposely incorporate it into their national law. In these instances,
however, Article 29 would only prohibit direct contacts between
adopters and birth parents or individual guardians until appropriate
authorities have determined a child adoptable and the prospective
adopters qualified. As a practical matter, prospective adopters will
likely have obtained a determination of their suitability before they
arrive in a sending nation, whether or not they enlist the aid of an
agency.98 After this determination, they may then contact local agen-
cies, orphanages, or other institutions - but not individual guardians or
parents - with regard to children who may be or become available for
adoption.99 They may even contact individual guardians of children as
96. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1142 (Article 29).
97. See, Peter Pfund, Memorandum to Members of the Study Group on Intercountry Adop-
tion, at 60-64 (Mar. 4, 1992) (on fie with the author).
98. Under the Convention as under current law, prospective adopters must have an ap-
proved, homestudy before they can fulfill the U.S. immigration requirements for intercountry
adoption.
99. See also Pfund, supra note 97, at 63-64. The no contact rule applies only to contacts with
parents or other persons responsible for a child. The Convention differentiates between such
persons who are individuals, and institutions or bodies, which are not subject to the no contact
rule.
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to whom a court or other authority has already made a determination
of adoptability.
There is another important type of direct contact that Article 29
does not prohibit and that the Convention explicitly condones. Under
Article 22, depending on local law, an adopter could enlist the aid of a
non-agency facilitator who is a local professional authorized to pro-
vide adoption assistance. Non-agency professionals might include lo-
cal lawyers, doctors, or religious officials. If local law permits, the
Convention would allow local professionals to act as intermediaries
who may match adoptable children with adopters.
Thus, parent-initiated or independent adoption will depend upon
the amenability of local laws and regulations of non-agency profes-
sionals and whether overseas guardians, such as an orphanage, are
willing and able to obtain adoptability determinations in advance and
to deal directly with individual adopters. Of course, the possibility of
independent adoption has always depended on local law, custom, and
practice, and such will continue to be the case with or without the
Convention.
C. The Regulation of Intercountry Adoption Agencies
The Convention provision most likely to generate enduring con-
troversy in the United States is the Article 10 requirement of an ac-
creditation process for intercountry adoption agencies. 10 Few would
dispute that adoption agencies should be subject to some degree of
government oversight and regulation, but no consensus exists about
the best weight or distribution of regulatory authority. Some have
suggested that the U.S. should use the Convention as an opportunity
to build a new, stronger, and more vigilant regulatory authority.
While this argument has some appeal, there appears to be little sup-
port for the creation of a self-sufficient federal bureaucracy to regu-
late adoption agencies, even if limited to the regulation of
intercountry agencies. In an era of fiscal frugality and distaste for cen-
tralization, any proposal for a federal takeover or duplication of func-
tions already performed by the states will be met with extreme
100. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (Article 10). The accreditation requirements
would affect only the right to provide intercountry adoption services, and not, as some have
suggested, domestic adoption services. Some of the confusion over the Convention's effect on
domestic adoption services probably stems from widespread discussion of the usefulness of Con-
vention or federal implementing standards as a model for state regulators. However, such
change will occur, if at all, because state regulators choose it, and not because it will be required
by the Convention or any likely version of federal implementing legislation.
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skepticism. Some smaller agencies also fear that a centralized regula-
tory process might be captured by larger, better established agencies
that would manipulate the process to promote exclusionary standards
inhibiting competition or diversity. 01
On the other hand, it may be impossible to implement the Con-
vention without some degree of federal participation in the licensing
process. At the very least, federal involvement must include encour-
agement and guidance to state licensing authorities because the Con-
vention prescribes accreditation standards that no state presently
achieves. 0 2 A more difficult question is the extent to which federal
authorities should share responsibility for enforcing compliance with
the Convention's minimum accreditation standards. The answer de-
pends in part on the current status and prospective reliability of local
licensing.
D. The Requirement of a Licensing Scheme
Implementation of the Convention's accreditation requirements
need not impose a substantial new regulatory burden. Nearly every
U.S. jurisdiction has a licensing or other approval system on which to
build,0 3 and which may serve as the foundation for accreditation
under the Convention. Naturally, the quality and method of regula-
tion varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. My own survey of pub-
lished regulations does not conclusively establish whether any state
has the ability to effectively administer and enforce its published li-
censing standards. Nevertheless, a few simple objective observations
are possible. In all licensing jurisdictions license terms range from one
to five years.' 4 Licensing authority is backed by the power to con-
duct on-site inspections and require disclosure of records and informa-
tion.'0 Finally, licenses are subject to mid-term revocation."°
Hawaii appears to be the most important exception, although
there may be some regulation by local welfare authorities in that state.
101. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ADVISORY COMmrIrEE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
Minutes of the 4th Meeting, at 6 (Oct. 4, 1993) (on file with author).
102. See infra notes 109-56 and accompanying text.
103. I include systems such as that of New York, which does not license adoption agencies
but which grants nonprofit corporate charters to adoption agencies meeting certain criteria. The
criteria resemble the licensing standards of other states, and a charter, like a license, is subject to
revocation or non-renewal. See, e.g., N.Y. NoT-FoR-PROFrT CoRP. LAW § 404(b) (McKinney
1970 & Supp. 1994).
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There are also a number of jurisdictions influenced by the United
States that take entirely different approaches to the regulation of child
placement activities. For example, in the Virgin Islands the local so-
cial welfare agency appears to be responsible for all placements for
adoption. Therefore, there is no need for a licensing process. 0 7 In
the Mariana Islands, there does not appear to be any regulation of
child placement services.108
E. The Convention's Accreditation Requirements
Presently in the United States, agencies that provide intercountry
adoption services are licensed by the states or local jurisdictions. In
general, local regulations make no distinction between intercountry
adoption agencies and those that act on a purely intrastate basis.10 9 If
an agency has authority to place children with families within the
same country, it can also place children from another hemisphere.
The lack of a separate regulatory track for intercountry adoption
agencies might be of no consequence if local licensing standards were
on par with the Convention's minimum standards, but they are not.
Every U.S. licensing jurisdiction falls short in one way or another.
The Convention requires signatory nations to accredit agencies
specifically for intercountry adoption services, and it establishes addi-
tional minimum standards as follows:
1. The agency must demonstrate its competence to perform tasks
under the Convention;110
2. The agency must "be directed and staffed by persons qualified
by their ethical standards and by training or experience to work
in the field of intercountry adoption;" ''
107. Letter from Juel T. R. Molloy, Commissioner of the Virgin Islands Dep't of Human
Services, to Richard R. Carlson (Apr. 29, 1992) (on file with the author).
108. Letter from Lorenzo I. De Leon Guerrero, Governor of the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, to Richard R. Carlson (Jan. 3, 1992) (on file with the author).
109. One possible exception is the State of Washington, which requires that "an agency pro-
viding ... intercountry adoption ... shall have supervisor staff having specialized training."
WASHINGTON DEP'T OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, MINIMUM LICENSING REQUIREMENTS
FOR CHILD-PLACING AGENCIES, § 388-73-214 (Nov. 1987). The Washington regulations do not
indicate what would constitute such specialized training.
A few states do impose additional procedural requirements for an agency engaged in in-
tercountry placement, such as the agency's agreement to abide by immigration and foreign law,
or proof of the sending nation's authorization for the agency to place children from that nation.
See, e.g., COLORADO DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVICES, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CHILD PLACE-
MENT AGENCIES; OREGON CHILDREN'S SERVICES DIV., RULES GOVERNING STANDARDS FOR
PRIVATE CHILD-CARING AGENCIES, OR. ADMIN. R. 412-24-050 (1979).
110. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 11(a)).
111. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 11(b)).
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3. The agency must be non-profit;11 2
4. Agency personnel must not receive "remuneration which is un-
reasonably high in relation to services rendered;"" 3 and
5. The agency must "be subject to supervision... as to [its] com-
position, operation and financial situation.""14
Most U.S. agencies routinely engaged in intercountry adoption
would easily qualify under these requirements. Nevertheless, an
agency's possession of a license under the current system is not the
equivalent of accreditation under the Convention, and it is possible
that some currently licensed agencies might not qualify for
accreditation.
1. Demonstration of Competence
Existing licensing schemes require agencies to demonstrate their
competence to provide adoption services by the combination of all the
other types of requirements described below, including staffing re-
quirements, education and experience requirements, and continuing
education requirements. The Convention would add an additional re-
quirement for intercountry accreditation: an agency must prove a spe-
cial competence for intercountry adoption services in particular.
Presently, none of the states require such a demonstration.
To add such a requirement to existing licensing schemes could be
relatively simple. In addition to the usual educational and experience
requirements," 5 licensing authorities could require that personnel for
intercountry services must have some combination of intercountry ex-
perience and education, or that they be subject to supervision by a
person having these qualifications. The educational requirement
could be fulfilled by attendance at intercountry adoption training pro-
grams in the existing network of continuing professional education. A
more rigorous, but also more costly requirement, would be satisfac-
tory performance on a written test like those used by some state bars
in certifying attorneys for specialization.
The issue of grandfathering experienced adoption professionals
will doubtless arise in the imposition of new training requirements.
The best approach, however, would be to require some minimum level
of new training without exception. If and when the U.S. implements
112. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 11(a)).
113. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 32(a)).
114. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 11(c)).
115. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
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the Convention, the rules will change and past experience might not
be a suitable guide for future practice. Thus, even the most exper-
ienced professionals should obtain training in the rules of the Conven-
tion regardless of whether they are excused from training in other
matters of intercountry adoption.
2. Qualified Staffing
Convention Article 11(b) requires that accredited bodies "be di-
rected and staffed by persons qualified by their ethical standards and
by training or experience to work in the field of intercountry adop-
tion. '116 As noted above, Article 11 requires more than proof of
one's credentials of training or experience in adoption in general, as
opposed to specific training or experience in intercountry adoption.
Accrediting authorities must implement additional intercountry adop-
tion training requirements for those agencies that choose to pursue
intercountry adoptions.
Article 11 is not only concerned with specialized training. It also
appears to require a more general foundation in education and experi-
ence in adoption and social work. Presently, nearly all states require
agency management and staff to meet varying educational and experi-
ence requirements." 7 A few also have separate professional licensing
programs for social workers, including adoption specialists." 8
116. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 11(b)).
117. State educational and experience requirements usually include a range of minimum ed-
ucation and experience requirements for different classifications of personnel. The primary dif-
ferences between the states lie in the number of years or specificity of experience that are
required for different personnel.
Arkansas's scheme is typical. An "administrator," who is responsible for an agency's gen-
eral management and administration, must have a master's degree in social work or a related
field and two years experience in a child placement agency, or a bachelor's degree in social work
or a related field and four years experience in a child placement agency, including two years in
an administrative capacity. A "supervisor" of child placement services must have a master's
degree in social work or a related field and one year's experience in a human services field, or a
bachelor's degree in social work or a related field and two year's experience in a human services
field. A "child placement worker," who works under the direction of a child placement supervi-
sor, must have a master's degree in social work or a related field or a bachelor's degree in social
work or a related field and one year's experience. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, Div.
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, MINIMUM LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR CHILD PLACE-
mENT AGENCIES 13-15 (1988).
Other states require more years of experience, more specifically related experience, or pos-
session of a state license or certification in social work. ALABAMA DEP'T OF HUMAN RE.
SOURCES, M41MtM STANDARDS FOR CHILD PLACING AGENCIES 10-12 (4th ed. 1989); S.D.
ADMIN. R. 67:42:09:03.
118. ALABAMA DEP'T OF HUMAN RESOURCES, supra note 117; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§§ 1901-18 (1968 & Supp. 1994); S.D. ADrIN. R. 67:42:09:03 (1991).
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With regard to ethical standards, most but not all states require
employment and criminal background checks of varying depth for
some or all agency personnel. 119 A few states have also adopted codes
of ethics for agencies and agency personnel. 20 Another method of
assuring ethical practices by agencies is to establish a highly visible
and effective process for receiving, investigating and remedying com-
plaints, a matter addressed further below.' 21
3. Non-Profit Objectives and the Problem of Unreasonable
Remuneration
Convention Article 8 requires contracting nations to prevent "im-
proper financial or other gain" by persons involved in the adoption
process.'22 The possibility of improper gain by adoption agencies in
particular is further addressed in Article 11(a), which requires that an
accredited body "shall pursue only non-profit objectives."'123 Finally,
Article 32 permits the payment or receipt of "only costs and expenses,
including reasonable professional fees of persons involved in the
adoption," and it prohibits a director, administrator, or employee of
an agency from receiving "remuneration which is unreasonably high
in relation to services rendered.' 1 24 Whether existing licensing regula-
tions will assure compliance with these Convention provisions remains
a question.
The answer could be more complicated than one might guess, de-
pending on how exacting the definition of profit or improper gain.
The vast majority of U.S. adoption agencies are probably non-profit in
the sense that they do not exist for the purpose of earning a profit for
owners or investors. Yet it may be in the interest of an agency or its
managers to charge adoption fees in excess of actual or reasonable
service costs. Agency managers may be tempted to earn the
119. See, eg., A GUIDEBOOK TO ALASKA'S PLACEMENT AGENCY REGULATIONS 13, 188
(1981); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit.7, § 51.110 (July 1989); ARIZONA DEP'T OF ECONOMIC SECUR-
rrv, ADOPTION AGENCY LICENSING STANDARDS, R6-5-7024 (1987).
120. See, eg., UTAH DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF Lic., CHILD PLACING AGENCY
RULES § A (1991); UTAH ADMIN. R. 501-7(21) (1991). Utah's rules include prohibitions against
favoritism in services for the agency's staff and board, paying or receiving referral fees, and
steering clients to private practices in which the agency's staff or consultants are engaged. They
also prohibit board members from having certain financial interests in the agency. See also WY-
OMING DEP'T OF FAMILY SERVICES, STANDARDS FOR CERTIFICATION OF PROVIDERS OF SUBSTI-
TUTE CARE SERVICES FOR CHILDREN 79 (Feb. 1991).
121. See infra notes 140-56 and accompanying text.
122. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 8).
123. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 11(a)).
124. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1143 (art. 32).
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equivalent of a profit or dividend by taking surplus agency funds in
the form of inordinate salaries for themselves. This possibility un-
doubtedly lies behind the Convention's prohibition against unreasona-
ble remuneration, Another motivation for fees in excess of costs is
that an agency may use the extra earnings from adoption services to
subsidize other services or activities, or to cover the cost of fiscal
mismanagement.125
The difficulty of identifying improper financial gain by adoption
agencies is illustrated by the multitude of approaches U.S. jurisdic-
tions take to this problem. At the outset, the states may be divided
into two general categories. First, most states either explicitly author-
ize or fail to clearly prohibit for-profit adoption agencies. 26 Second,
several states clearly limit child placement activities to non-profit or-
ganizations. 127 The potential complexity of the problem is best illus-
trated by the latter group of states. While most attack the issue by a
simple requirement that agencies must be non-profit, others prevent
profit by judicial or administrative regulation of fees.128 However,
among the latter group there is no consensus about how to regulate
fees. Some permit an agency to calculate its average cost for all adop-
tions in order to establish a uniform base fee, and a few have endeav-
ored to draft guidelines for what costs might appropriately be
125. In Arizona, for example, a report by the local Department of Economic Security re-
vealed that nonprofit agencies, as well as for-profit agencies, sometimes charge inordinate fees
and engage in other unsavory fee collection practices as a result of fiscal mismanagement. See
Kim Sue Lia Perkes, DES Report: Ban Upfront Adoption Fees, AiZONA REPUBLIC, Aug. 12,
1992, at B-i; Agency for Adoptions Loses License, ORLANDo SENTINEL, Apr. 9, 1988, at D7.
126. These jurisdictions include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii
(which does not regulate agencies), Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, vsconsin, and Wyoming. See citations
in Appendix B.
In some of these states the adoption court will review an accounting of all fees in connection
with the adoption, but the primary function of this review appears to be the prevention of illegal
compensation to the birth parents or other unlicensed parties. In some cases, courts have re-
ferred to baby-selling statutes in holding that an agency may not profit from the placement of a
child. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl D, 517 A.2d 925, 928-29 (Pa. 1986). However, fees of licensed
child placement agencies are frequently excepted from these criminal statutes, and a few states,
such as Wyoming, lack any baby-selling statutes at all.
127. For examples, see California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
Texas, Utah, Vermont. See citations in Appendix B.
128. For examples of this approach, see the following states' regulations: District of Colum-
bia, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Nevada. Some, such as Alabama, do not clearly prohibit profit
but do regulate fees. See citations in Appendix B.
32
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 30 [1994], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol30/iss2/1
1994] HAGUE CONFERENCE ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 275
included in such a calculation. 129 Some permit, and others require, an
agency to establish a sliding scale fee based on adoptive parent in-
come, so that wealthier parents subsidize poorer parents.3 0 It ap-
pears that only one state specifically prohibits an agency from using
adoption service income to support other social services. 131
The difficulty of regulating fees and costs is one good reason to
favor a simple approach. Another reason, and a possible explanation
for the states' relative indifference toward agency salaries, is that non-
profit status and agency salaries are already subject to the restrictions
of the Internal Revenue Code. Under the Code, a non-profit entity
may be exempt from taxation if no part of its net earnings inures to
the benefit of any individual. 32 Compensation that is unreasonable
may violate this requirement and deprive the agency of its exempt
status. 3 3 Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service may view the pay-
ment of unreasonable compensation as a diversion of agency profits,
and it might deny the agency any deduction for the payments.3 The
presence of these tax implications provides agencies with at least some
incentive for caution.
Moreover, inter-agency competition may be better than govern-
ment regulation for inhibiting excessive fees. The intercountry adop-
tion field is already dominated by nonprofit agencies whose fees are
probably lower than those of any prospective profit-seeking agency.
As long as adoptable children are plentiful in sending nations and
adopters have sufficient choices among non-profit agencies, there will
be little room for any agency to increase its fees to support excessive
costs, let alone profits.
Competition will not suffice to restrain all agencies if the oppor-
tunities for intercountry adoption decline drastically and adopters be-
come willing to pay exorbitant fees to any agency that claims the
means to place a child quickly. 35 Such may have happened in the
129. See, e.g., MD. REGS. CODE tit. 7, § 02.13.08L (1989); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1OM-
24.019 (1990).
130. See, e.g., MD. REGS. CODE, supra note 129.
131. NEVADA Div. OF CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES, STANDARDS AND PRESCRIBED RULES
FOR CHILD PLACING AGENCIES, § 29(3) (1992).
132. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988).
133. See Church of Scientology v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 823 F.2d 1310, 1315
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1987); B.H.W. Anesthesia Found. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 72 T.C. 681, 685-86 (1979).
134. See United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096, 1101 (6th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 456 U.S.
983 (1981).
135. Corrupt practices by adoption agencies are not always the result of the profit motive.
Occasionally, a non-profit agency engages in illegal or unethical fee practices in a struggle to
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domestic adoptions field, where fees are comparatively much
higher,'136 and it might someday happen in the intercountry adoptions
field. Even now, prospective adopters deemed unsuitable by many
agencies or sending nations, because of age, non-marital status, or
other factors, may be the driving force behind unusually high in-
tercountry adoption fees charged in nations that have no age or mari-
tal status requirements. 37
The typical state non-profit requirement, supplemented by Inter-
nal Revenue Service rules, might be sufficient to comply with the Con-
vention's minimum obligation to prevent improper financial gain.
However, very modest additional measures would better secure U.S.
compliance with the Convention. For example, regulators should re-
quire disclosure of fees and compensation, and make further inquiry
of particular adoptions or agencies that depart significantly from the
average. Many states already require written and detailed agency fee
schedules to permit adopters to compare fees and to prevent unex-
pected charges or increases in fees.' 31 Unfortunately, it appears that
licensing authorities in most states do not routinely review or compare
agency salaries and benefits, and many lack sufficient regulatory au-
thority to investigate or restrain unreasonable compensation.
An additional modest measure to strengthen the prohibition of
improper gain would be to incorporate some of the ethical standards a
few states require of agencies and agency personnel. 39 For example,
licensing authorities should consider prohibiting various types of self-
dealing, conflicts of interest, or receipt of an applicant's charitable do-
nation - which may be the equivalent of a premium fee in exchange
for favorable treatment.
4. Supervision of Agencies
Convention Article 11(c) requires that accredited bodies "be sub-
ject to supervision.., as to their composition, operation and financial
situation."' 4 ° This requirement appears to have two separate aspects.
overcome a shortage of finances for its operations. See, e.g., Kim Sue Lia Perkes, DES Report:
Ban Upfront Adoption Fees, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Aug. 12, 1992, at B-1 (describing an investiga-
tion of troubled for-profit and non-profit agencies in Arizona).
136. See id.
137. Eugene Robinson, In Peru, Anxieties Over Adoption; Some Accused of Baby Selling to
Exploit American Market, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 8, 1992, at Al.
138. For an example of such an approach, see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317A.907(6) (West Supp.
1994).
139. See, e.g., UTAH ADMIN. R. 501-7(21) (1991).
140. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1141 (art. 11(c)).
[Vol. 30:243
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First, it seems to require standards for agency organization, member-
ship, finances, and management. Second, it requires ongoing supervi-
sion of agencies, so that the initial licensing process is not the only
point of regulatory oversight.
The first requirement, standards for organization, finances, and
management, is largely, if not entirely, fulfilled by every jurisdiction
that licenses adoption agencies. Licensing jurisdictions uniformly re-
quire at least some form of managing hierarchy and supervision, with
different educational and experience requirements for each level, and
specified levels of supervision, minimum funding, annual audits, and
specified filing, documentation, personnel and casehandling prac-
tices.' 4' The rigorousness of state standards for these matters varies
widely, but the Convention does not specify any minimum standards
in this regard.
A more complicated question is whether current regulations com-
ply with the Convention's more general requirement that accredited
bodies must be subject to supervision of their composition. The ma-
jority of states require licensed agencies to be incorporated, or at least
subject to oversight by an independent board of directors or advi-
sors, 4' but a substantial minority of states permit individuals or part-
nerships to own and operate agencies, often without a board.143
141. Nearly all of the licensing jurisdictions listed in Appendix B have all or most of these
rules.
142. JOAN HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACrICE § 3.04[4] (5th ed. 1993 & Supp. Sept.
1993). Some, such as Iowa, require a governing board, but prescribe minimal rules for the
board's composition or operation. IowA DEP'T OF HuMAN SERVICES, LICENSING AND REGULA-
TION OF CHILD PLACING AGENCIES (1992), to be codified at IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-108.1 to
441-108.11 (board's membership must be such as to provide for continuity; board to meet regu-
larly). See also WYOMING DEP'T OF FAMILY SERVICES, STANDARDS FOR CERTIFICATION OF
PROVIDERS OF SUBSTITUTE CARE SERVICES FOR CHILDREN 79 (1991) (requiring only that
agency must have a governing body).
143. See WEST VIRGINIA DEPT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR
CHILD PLACING AGENCIES 9 (1992) ("If a child placing agency is owned by a sole proprietor, the
responsibility imposed on a governing body by this subsection shall be borne by that proprie-
tor."); VIRGINIA DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVICES, GENERAL PROCEDURES AND INFORMATION FOR
LICENSURE § 2.1 (1989) (an agency may be an individual or a partnership without a governing
board). See also ALABAMA DEPT OF HUMAN RESOURCE, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CHILD
PLACING AGENCIES 6 (4th ed. 1989); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE, tit. 7, § 51.110 (July 1989); ARI-
ZONA DEP'T OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, ADOPTION AGENCY LICENSING STANDARDS R6-5-7024
(1987); ARKANSAS DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, Div. OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CHILD PLACEMENT AGENCIES 10-11 (1988); COLORADO DEPT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CHILD PLACEMENT AGENCIES § 7.710.21
(1991); CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-49b-14 and 17-49b-24 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994); DELA-
WARE DEP'T OF SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEm FAMILIES, DEL.: REQUIREMENTS
FOR CHILD PLACING AGENCIES 5 (1986); MAINE DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, RULES PROVID-
ING FOR THE LICENSING OF CHILD PLACING AGENCIES WITH AND WITHOUT ADOPTION PRO-
GRAMS 12 (1989); MICHIGAN DEPT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, LICENSING RULES FOR CHILD
PLACING AGENCIES (1980); MISSISSippi DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES 2-3 (1992); MONTANA
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While the Convention does not clearly require any particular organi-
zational form, except that an agency must constitute a "body," it is
possible that individuals cannot qualify as accredited agencies under
the Convention.'" It is also questionable whether the most infor-
mally organized agencies are subject to supervision as to their
composition.
The safest approach would be to limit accreditation to formal in-
stitutions, or at least those with independent boards of directors.
While the existence of an independent board is no guarantee of man-
agement competence, it can enhance the agency's continuity, financial
stability, and ethical and legal behavior. The need for this precaution
is even greater for the additional risks and complexities of intercoun-
try adoption.
An even more difficult issue is whether existing licensing authori-
ties provide sufficient or competent ongoing supervision of licensed
adoption agencies. In general, licensing authorities have three occa-
sions for reviewing agency compliance; the initial licensing process,
relicensing, and investigation of complaints. 45
The initial licensing process is usually the occasion of the most
intense examination. Thus, many regulators report that the time and
effort required of them in initial licensing is substantially greater than
DEP'T. OF FAMILY SERVICES, LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR CHILD PLACING AGENCIES AND
ADOPTION AGENCIES 1 (1988); NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF HUMAN RESOURCES, RuLEs FOR
CHILD PLACING AGENCIES (1990), to be codified at N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 41N.0201 (Aug.
1991); TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit.40, § 720.26 (Supp. 1993-94).
144. Several states authorize the licensing of an unincorporated agency operated by an indi-
vidual, provided the agency also has the oversight of a governing board. See, e.g., RHODE IS.
LAND DEP'T FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES, CHILD PLACING REGULATIONS 9 (1987). The
establishment of a board might be sufficient to qualify the agency as a body.
If the U.S. chose to do so, it could provide a separate listing system for individuals to per-
form intercountry child placing services under Article 22. See infra notes 164-171. Thus, an
agency that does not qualify as a body might not be foreclosed from providing most of the same
services, depending on federal implementing legislation.
145. In most states public oversight is also bolstered to a very modest extent by the require-
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in relicensing.4 All licensing jurisdictions provide for follow-up in-
spection or review, but the rigorousness of the authorities' examina-
tion at relicensing varies widely, and relicensing intervals range from
one year to five years.147
Some observers have questioned whether the existing licensing
and relicensing schemes are as effective as they appear on paper. A
regulatory authority that is woefully understaffed cannot properly su-
pervise existing agencies, nor can it offer timely approval for new
ones, regardless of the quality of its written regulations." My own
very informal survey of state regulators provides as least some ground
for caution.
Roughly two thirds of the regulators questioned specifically re-
sponded to inquiry whether they believed their resources were suffi-
cient for their present tasks. Half of these were confident,'149 and the
146. See, e.g., Letter from Cecil D. Andrus, Governor of Idaho, to Richard R. Carlson (Mar.
9, 1992) (one day for initial license, approximately sixteen hours for renewal); Letter from Rob-
ert E. Bree, Director, Michigan Division of Child Welfare Licensing, to Richard R. Carlson
(Mar. 27, 1992) (three days for initial license; one to two days for renewal); Letter from Gary
Stangler, Director, Missouri Department of Social Services, to Richard R. Carlson (Feb. 6,1992)
(sixteen hours for initial license, eight hours for renewal) (All correspondence on file with the
author).
147. See Appendix B.
148. Most licensing authorities have the power to grant temporary or provisional licenses to
agencies not yet fully in compliance or not yet completely inspected. See, e.g., COLORADO DEP'T
OF SOCIAL SERVICES, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CHILD PLACEMENT AGENCIES § 7.710.34
(Mar. 1991); DELAWARE DEP'T OF SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR FAMILIES,
DEL.: REQUIREMENTS FOR CHILD PLACING AGENCIES 3 (Mar. 1986); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN.
r. 10M-24 (1990); GEORGIA DEP'T OF HUMAN RESOURCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR
CHILD PLACING AGENCIES (Feb. 1984).
149. Alabama: Letter from Charles Cleveland, Commissioner, Department of Human Re-
sources (Feb. 11, 1992); California: Letter from James Brown, Chief of Adoptions Branch, De-
partment of Social Services (Feb. 20, 1992); Indiana: Letter from Marilyn Scales, Family and
Social Services Administration (Jan. 9, 1992); Kansas: Memorandum from Donna Whiteman,
Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services, to Joan Fimney, Governor, (Feb. 4, 1992; Mary-
land: Letter from Stephanie Pettaway, Adoption Program Specialist, Department of Human Re-
sources (Mar. 18,1992); Montana: Letter from Betsy Stimatz, Program Officer H, Department of
Family Services (June 15, 1992); Nevada: Letter from Wanda Scott, Social Service Specialist,
Department of Human Resources (Nov. 19,1992); New York: Letter from Joseph Semidei, Dep-
uty Commissioner, Department of Social Services (Feb. 20, 1992); North Carolina: Letter from
Robin Peacock, Program Manager for Adoption Services, Department of Human Resources
(Feb. 29, 1992); Ohio: Letter from Annette Justice, Chief of Adoption Services Section, Depart-
ment of Human Services (Feb. 19,1992); Oklahoma: Letter from Benjamin Demps, Jr., Director,
Department of Human Services (Feb. 11, 1992); South Carolina: Letter from Kathleen Hayes,
Executive Assistant, Division of Adoption and Birth Parent Services (April 19, 1992); Tennes-
see: Letter from Robert A. Grunow, Commissioner, Department of Human Services (March 3,
1992); Texas: Letter from Burton Raiford, Interim Commissioner, Department of Human Serv-
ices (Feb. 7, 1992); Utah: Letter from William S. Ward, Deputy Administrator, Department of
Human Services, Division of Family Services (Jan. 21, 1992; Wisconsin: Letter from Geral
Whitburn, Secretary, Department of Health and Social Services (Jan. 16,1992; Wyoming: Memo-
randum from Kathleen Petersen, Division of Youth Services, Department of Family Services
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balance ranged from guarded1 50 to distressed. 151 It would be danger-
ous to infer too much from these responses because a regulator's satis-
faction may have less to do with comparative resources than with
comparative aspirations. For example, the response from Maryland
indicated satisfaction with regulatory resources, 52 but Maryland law
requires reinspection only once every five years, in contrast to the
usual one year interval for most other states.' 3
A third occasion for regulatory oversight is the investigation of
complaints against an agency. Ideally, the process for receiving, inves-
tigating, and remedying complaints or reported violations should be
highly visible and accessible to agency clients and personnel. Unfortu-
nately, only a few states have clearly established any formal processes
for investigation by public authorities. 4 A few require only that pri-
vate agencies create processes to investigate themselves. 55
(undated 1992) (Unless otherwise indicated, all correspondence to the author, Richard R. Carl-
son, and on file with author).
150. Alaska: Letter from Vicki Koehler, Adoption Coordinator, Alaska Department of
Health and Social Services (Apr. 12, 1992); Arizona: Letter from Linda Moore-Cannon, Direc-
tor, Department of Economic Security (Feb. 27, 1992); Delaware: Letter from Mary Ball Mor-
ton, Administrator of Interstate Compacts, Department of Services for Children, Youth and
Their Families (Jan. 27, 1992); Florida: Letter from Lawton Chiles, Governor (Jan. 31, 1992);
Georgia: Letter from Martin Rotter, Director, Office of Regulatory Services (Jan. 31, 1992);
Missouri: Letter from Gary Strangler, Director, Department of Social Services (Feb. 6, 1992);
New Mexico: Letter from Richard W. Heim, Secretary, Human Services Department (Jan. 28,
1992); Pennsylvania: Letter from Warren Lewis, Director, Division of State Services, Depart-
ment of Public Welfare (Jan. 29,1992); South Dakota: Memorandum from Department of Social
Services, Office of Child Protection Services (undated, received Feb. 1992) (All correspondence
to the author, Richard R. Carlson and on file with author).
151. Arkansas: Letter from Pat Page, Assistant Director of Field Operations, Department of
Human Services, Division of Children and Family Services (undated, received Feb. 1992); Idaho:
Letter from Cecil D. Andrus, Governor (Mar. 9, 1992); Michigan: Letter from Robert E. Bree,
Director, Division of Child Welfare Licensing (Mar. 27, 1992); Nebraska: Letter from Mary
Dean Harvey, Director, Department of Social Services (Jan. 14, 1992); New Jersey: Letter from
Octavia Melendez, Assistant Section Chief (Mar. 24, 1992); Oregon: Letter from Barbara Rob-
erts, Governor (Apr. 15, 1992); Vermont: Letter from Cynthia Walcott, Adoption Coordinator,
Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (Mar. 26, 1992); Virginia: Letter from Larry
D. Jackson, Commissioner, Department of Social Services (Feb. 7, 1992); Washington: Letter
from Diana Roberts, Director, Division of Children and Family Services (Jan. 17, 1992) (All
correspondence to the author, Richard R. Carlson and on file with author).
152. Letter from Stephanie Pettaway, Adoption Program Specialist, Maryland Department
of Human Resources, to Richard R. Carlson (Mar. 18, 1992) (on file with author).
153. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 5-501 to 5-520 (1991 & Supp. 1994). I was generally
unsuccessful in obtaining other objective measures of existing regulatory capacity. I inquired
about budgets allocated to agency regulation and personnel assigned to licensing and oversight
functions, but most of the answers I received were uninformative for purposes of comparison.
Many responding agencies spread their budgets and personnel over many social service func-
tions without any specific allocation for licensing functions.
154. Good examples may be found in the statutes or regulations of New York and Wisconsin.
See citations in Appendix B.
155. These include Delaware, Georgia, and Michigan. See citations in Appendix B.
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These many variations in the quality and method of state regula-
tion would not necessarily violate either the express terms or the spirit
of the Convention. The Convention provides in the most general
terms only that there must be a competent authority that can provide
ongoing supervision.156 Arguably, all U.S. licensing jurisdictions sat-
isfy at least a minimal version of this standard. Whether minimal
compliance is an appropriate U.S. response to the Convention is a
question at the heart of debate over the means for implementing the
Convention.
F. How Should the U.S. Accredit Intercountry Adoption Agencies?
By its terms, the Convention would permit the U.S. to assign
complete responsibility for accreditation either to the federal govern-
ment or to state and local jurisdictions. 57 As a practical matter, how-
ever, federal and state authorities will almost certainly need to share
this responsibility. Creation of an independent federal bureaucracy to
accredit intercountry adoption agencies would duplicate existing state
licensing systems at a cost that would be difficult to justify. However,
existing state bureaucracies may be insufficiently motivated to fulfill
federal treaty obligations at the expense of local goals, poorly-
equipped to interpret and implement international law, and without
any satisfactory means to monitor the overseas activities of adoption
agencies.
Thus, at the very least, a federal central authority must provide
advisory assistance to state licensing authorities by educating state of-
ficials about the terms of the Convention and, perhaps, by supplying
model licensing standards. The federal central authority would also
assist the intercountry adoption process, where necessary, by coordi-
nating and facilitating communications between foreign and state
adoption officials.
This federal guidance scheme has the virtue of minimizing costs
and preserving the predominant role of state authorities in the licens-
ing process. But restricting the federal government to a purely advi-
sory role is ill-advised for a matter affecting U.S. international
relations and treaty compliance. Authorities in other nations will tend
to view the U.S. as one nation rather than as fifty-plus jurisdictions,
and one U.S. jurisdiction's regulatory failure may have repercussions
156. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 11).
157. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 6).
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for all. 158 In addition, jurisdictions with the very weakest regulatory
oversight may become havens for agencies disqualified from practic-
ing in other states.
Another risk is that some U.S. jurisdictions will simply choose not
to provide the accrediting scheme required by the Convention. A
non-licensing jurisdiction, such as Hawaii, will not necessarily create
and finance a new licensing scheme simply because the U.S. ratifies
the Convention. Nor is there any guarantee that licensing jurisdic-
tions will accept new costs and responsibilities under the Convention,
or that they will make the necessary adjustments in timely fashion.
Even now, some adoption professionals complain that licensing de-
partments that exist on paper may lie dormant for extended periods
during funding or personnel shortfalls, or that licensing officials may
be predisposed against intercountry adoption and uncooperative in
dealing with intercountry adoption agencies.159
Thus, a system that relies entirely on the states to implement Ar-
ticle 10 cannot serve as an adequate guarantee of U.S. obligations
under the Convention. At a minimum, there must be federal author-
ity to review state licensing systems and distinguish states that comply
from those that do not. Further, the Federal government should have
a greater range of options than merely declaring that some states are
outside the Convention. A patchwork of Convention states and non-
Convention states will confuse foreign authorities and be a grave dis-
service to prospective adopters and agencies in states that are
disqualified.
Federal oversight over state social welfare regulation has many
precedents from which to choose. For example, to encourage state
and local officials to carry out certain social welfare policies, the fed-
eral government has offered financial assistance contingent on compli-
ance with federal standards.160 Federal review of state social welfare
158. This risk is all the greater if the federal government grants extra credibility to state
accreditations by providing a universally recognizable federal or U.S. accreditation document to
agencies accredited by state authorities.
159. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw,
Minutes, 4th Meeting (Oct. 4, 1993) at 5 (on file with author).
Non-implementation in a particular jurisdiction would leave the residents of that jurisdic-
tion without the opportunity for intercountry adoption. One possible solution would be for pro-
spective adopters in a non-accrediting jurisdiction to enlist the services of an agency in another,
accrediting jurisdiction. The accredited agency would then provide for placement with the
adopters via the Interstate Compact on Adoption. Some state regulations already provide for
application of the Compact by out-of-state agencies or in any intercountry adoption. See
ALAsKA ADMIN. CODE tit.7, § 51.110 (July 1989).
160. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 652, 654 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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programs has included not only review of substantive rules and stan-
dards, but also review of the adequacy of local funding and
personnel. 61
Admittedly, there are practical difficulties in such an approach. It
is unlikely that the federal government will offer significant new finan-
cial assistance for local implementation of the Convention. Thus, it
may be necessary to require Convention implementation as a condi-
tion for existing funding for other, unrelated social welfare programs.
Moreover, inducing local compliance by financial incentives always
risks leaving federal authorities with a difficult choice if local officials
fail in some degree in their duty. Should federal authorities risk a
worse crisis by actually terminating contingent financial assistance for
that jurisdiction? If a state's accreditation scheme is disapproved,
what will take its place?
A different incentive, also with some precedent in existing federal
regulation, is to offer the opportunity for local control, combined with
the threat of federal control. 62 The instinctive drive to preserve local
control is often sufficient to induce local authorities to carry out fed-
eral policy, especially where the cost to local government is not sub-
stantial. Of course, this scheme depends on the existence of a reserve
federal authority and a willingness to exercise authority when local
officials fail. Some states with very weak or nonexistent licensing pro-
grams may, in fact, choose the less expensive course and defer to fed-
eral control.
Since some federal oversight of state accreditation programs is
essential in any event, a residual federal authority to grant accredita-
tion need not be substantially more intrusive or costly. Indeed, there
are special advantages in reserving to federal authorities the ultimate
power to accredit agencies in all U.S. jurisdictions.
A more direct federal role in accreditation might work as follows.
First, federal authorities would approve local licensing systems ac-
cording to Convention standards. If a local jurisdiction's system is ap-
proved, an adoption agency's presentation of a license from that
jurisdiction would constitute prima facie evidence that the agency
161. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 301.1,305.20 (1993) (regarding approval of state plans for enforcement
of child support obligations).
162. There are many variations on this approach. For example, the Occupational Health and
Safety Act delegates to state authorities the responsibility for enforcing workplace safety stan-
dards, provided state enforcement programs satisfy the U.S. Department of Labor. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-78 (1988 & Supp. 1993). Otherwise, enforcement is by the Federal Occupational Safety
& Health Administration. Id
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qualifies for intercountry accreditation. In most such cases, accredita-
tion would be routine, but federal authorities might choose to engage
in further review based on additional information or challenges from
other parties.
If a local jurisdiction's licensing scheme is not approved, an in-
tercountry agency from that jurisdiction would require some other ev-
idence of its qualifications for accreditation. Federal authorities might
provide their own investigation of the agency's application, but they
might also accept some other form of prima facie evidence. Such evi-
dence might include accreditation by an approved private associa-
tion,163 or even by approved public authorities of other jurisdictions
willing to provide the service for a fee.
This more direct role for the federal government would require
the cost of federal review for every intercountry agency accreditation.
In the vast majority of accreditation cases, however, it is likely that
federal approval would be based on a simple confirmation of a local
license or accreditation by an approved private association. On the
other hand, federal accreditation would also have an added advantage
for adoption agencies, because foreign officials are more likely to rec-
ognize and accept a standard U.S. accreditation document than an ac-
creditation of a local jurisdiction.
G. Qualified Individual Professionals
In addition to permitting accredited private adoption agencies to
perform many central authority functions, the Convention permits a
contracting nation to declare that individuals and bodies specially
listed by that nation are qualified to perform any central authority
function except the taking of applications by prospective adopters.164
This provision appears to contemplate that listed individuals or bodies
will include those of traditional professions, such as the legal or social
services professions. 65
163. One private organization that accredits adoption services is the Council on Accredita-
tion of Services for Families and Children, headquartered in New York.
Regarding the constitutionality of delegation of regulatory functions to private associations,
see Cospita v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1984) and Evanston Ins. Co. v. Merin, 598 F.Supp.
1290 (D.NJ. 1984). In general, such a delegation is constitutional provided that responsible
public authorities retain oversight powers and ultimate authority over the process.
164. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1142 (art. 22(1),(3)). However, the preparation of
Article 15 and 16 reports about a child or prospective adopters must be performed under the
responsibility of accredited agencies or public central authorities. Hague Conference, supra note
4, at 1142 (art. 22(5)).
165. Among the qualifications for such individuals or bodies is that they must meet "require-
ments of... professional competence." Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1142 (art. 22(2)(a)).
[Vol. 30:243
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The possibility of such a special listing system has several implica-
tions for the U.S. First, depending on the manner of its implementa-
tion, it might provide an alternative avenue for a placement agency to
obtain authorization under the Convention. While the usual Article
10 accreditation provisions apply to "bodies," suggesting organiza-
tions of more than one person, many U.S. states permit the ownership
and operation of adoption agencies by individual proprietors.16 6
These individual agencies, even if they qualify as nonprofit, might not
be eligible for accreditation as bodies under the Convention. If the
U.S. decides to permit such agencies to provide intercountry services,
Article 22 would appear to be the appropriate means.167
Second, and more likely, the U.S. could use a special listing sys-
tem under Article 22 to authorize the performance of non-childplac-
ing professional services by individuals not associated with accredited
agencies. Presently every state permits lawyers, social workers, and
other types of individuals to perform non-placement tasks that include
Central Authority or accredited agency functions under the Conven-
tion. For example, a homestudy or similar report might be prepared
by an individual social worker. Similarly, certain counseling, prepara-
tion of documents, or assistance with immigration matters might be
provided by an individual lawyer. As long as the services in question
do not involve actual placement or matching of children with adopt-
ers, the professional need not obtain a child placing license, even in a
state that prohibits unlicensed child placing services. In other states
that permit placement activities by unlicensed intermediaries, the in-
termediary cannot charge any fee for the placement. 68
Implementation of an Article 22 listing system for social workers
would be particularly useful as an aid for independent or parent di-
rected adoptions lacking the assistance of an accredited agency. Even
licensed agencies often rely on social workers hired as independent
contractors to conduct homestudies. There appears to be no good
See also Peter Pfund, Intercountry Adoption: The 1993 Hague Convention: Its Purposes, Imple-
mentation and Promise, 28 FAm. L.Q. 53, 70-71 (1994).
166. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
167. If the U.S. adopts this option it must also decide whether to subject such agencies to
independent boards of directors or advisors, which is a measure some, but not all, states pres-
ently require. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
168. JoAN HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PxAcncn- § 3.01[4] (5th ed. 1993 & Supp.
1993). Admittedly, the distinction between placement activities and non-placement activities is
not always clear, especially where the services are by a lawyer combining non-placement legal
services for a fee, and free placement services. Id. at § 3.04[3].
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reason to subject these professionals to the institutional forms of a
licensed or accredited agency.
It is less clear whether a special listing system is necessary for
lawyers. Where the U.S. is the receiving nation, most of a lawyer's
routine activities in an adoption will not be central authority tasks
under the Convention and will require no new regulation. Thus, the
Convention would require no new authorization for a lawyer to repre-
sent adopters in an adoption proceeding, to represent the adopters
before the Immigration and Naturalization Service, or to advise
adopters how to proceed in an independent adoption. The lawyer
could not provide placement services, except in the unlikely event he
was specially authorized by the nation of origin. However, the lawyer
could be accountable for some central authority functions under the
Convention. For example, he might assume the responsibility under
Article 18 to "obtain permission for the child to leave the State of
origin. '169 He might also take responsibility for the child's transfer
under Article 19170 or provide information under Article 20.171 A law-
yer's acceptance of responsibility for these tasks might eliminate the
necessity for a designated public central authority for these tasks in
independent adoptions. It seems doubtful, however, that U.S. adopt-
ers or their lawyers will see any particular advantage in such an assign-
ment of responsibilities and liabilities. Lawyers may prefer simply to
advise and represent, without the burden of seeking special authority
or accepting special responsibility. If so, there is no reason for the
U.S. to specially list lawyers.
IV. THE UNITED STATES AS A NATION OF ORIGIN
Nearly all debate surrounding the Convention has concerned the
obligations the U.S. would have as a receiving nation. It is likely,
however, that the U.S. is also a nation of origin, albeit on a much
smaller scale. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know the significance
of child emigration for adoption in other nations, because the U.S.
lacks exit controls to monitor such a phenomena. Thus, if nonresi-
dents adopt a child in the U.S., or obtain appointment as a child's
guardian and take the child to their home nation for the purpose of
adoption, there may be no record of the child's intercountry adoption
or departure from the United States.
169. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1141 (art. 18).
170. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1141 (art. 19).
171. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1141 (art. 20).
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While there are no statistics or reliable estimates of child emigra-
tion from the U.S. for adoption,172 there are at least anecdotal reports
of such emigration and there are many reasons why such emigration is
likely to occur. Because of the opportunity for independent adoption,
nonresidents may seek to adopt in the U.S. much as residents of more
restrictive U.S. states may. There are also likely to be instances when
nonresidents wish to adopt a related U.S. born child. In these and
many other possible situations where the U.S. is a nation of origin, the
Convention will apply.
Nation~of origin duties need not be burdensome for the U.S., but
the U.S. must make certain decisions about methods of implementa-
tion. For example, the Convention will require the U.S. to accredit
agencies that arrange adoptions of U.S. born children with non-U.S.
residents. 73 Other important matters will be implementation, or re-
jection, of a no contact rule, rules relating to a birth parent's relin-
quishment, and monitoring of the intercountry adoption process. 174
A. Accreditation of Agencies and Professionals
Just as the U.S. must create a system for accrediting agencies
serving U.S. adopters, the U.S. must also accredit agencies that per-
form central authority functions on behalf of non-U.S. residents who
adopt U.S. born children. Does this mean that a non-accredited
agency would violate the Convention if it happened to place a U.S.
born child with nonresidents?
The answer to this question appears to depend on the circum-
stances. Adoption agencies sometimes act as guardians for children
available for adoption, and as such they may stand in the same posi-
tion as a birth parent or other guardian under the Convention. In
other words, an agency could agree to place an available child with
nonresident prospective adopters, just as a birth mother can place her
child with the adoptive family of her choice. However, any central
authority functions, such as the investigation of the child's back-
ground, the investigation of the prospective adopters, the official ap-
proval of the placement, and other important actions under the
172. Intercountry adoption between developed countries, especially neighboring ones,
clearly does occur on a minor scale. For example, U.S. residents brought 5 Canadian-born chil-
dren to the U.S. for the purpose of adoption in 1989. See UNrTED STATES IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 29 (1989).
173. See supra notes 109-56 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
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Convention, must be performed only by an accredited agency or other
central authority.175
B. Should the U.S. Adopt a No Contact Rule?
The Convention would restrict contacts between prospective
adopters and a child or the child's birth parents prior to other impor-
tant stages in the adoption process, except under conditions required
by the nation of origin. 76 In the U.S. many states permit independent
or non-agency adoptions in which there is no licensed intermediary
between a birth parent and the adopters, and in which direct contacts
are quite likely.17 7 Moreover, even in agency adoptions U.S. law may
permit a child's placement with a prospective adoptive family before
all necessary relinquishments have become binding. 78
Fortunately, the Convention permits nations of origin considera-
ble latitude in dealing with independent adoptions. 79 It requires only
that a nation of origin must choose whether and how to limit direct
contacts.' 80 In other words, the U.S. must decide either to condone
direct contacts and independent adoption in conformity with local
law, or to create new conditions for independent adoption by non-
U.S. residents. 8'
Given the difficulty the independent adoption issue has already
presented for U.S. lawmakers, and the multitude of approaches the
states have chosen, it is questionable whether implementation of the
Convention will be an occasion for developing a broad new federal
policy toward independent adoption. Congress might well choose
simply to defer to the states by requiring that direct contacts conform
with local law. On the other hand, given the special circumstances
and complexities of intercountry adoption, there may be some special
conditions appropriately required for direct contacts by non-U.S. resi-
dents. For example, because of the need to monitor the progress of
175. There is also possibility of a special listing for authorized professionals under Article 22.
See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
177. See, eg., JoAN HoLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PACrIcnE § 3.04[1] (5th ed. 1993 &
Supp. 1993). See also supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
178. HOLLaNGER, supra note 177, at § 3.03[3][a][1].
179. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
180. See Peter Pfund, Intercountry Adoption: The 1993 Hague Convention: Its Purposes, Im-
plementation and Promise, 28 FAm. L.Q. 53, 63-64 (1994).
181. In the absence of some definite action by the U.S. in regard to the direct contacts rule,
the Conventions appear to supply a default rule prohibiting direct contacts. For a justification
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adoptions under the Convention, it may be advisable to require non-
residents to file an application or statement of intent with an appropri-
ate authority before any direct contacts, if only to assure that the ap-
plicants can receive information about requirements for intercountry
adoption. Also, because the process for determining and confirming
the adopters' qualifications will be more laborious for nonresidents
than for residents, it may be appropriate to require nonresidents to
obtain such confirmation in advance of direct contacts. Otherwise,
the period between the first direct contacts and final approval of the
adoption may be exceptionally long and stressful for the parties, and if
the adopters are rejected the child's final placement will have been
needlessly delayed.
C. The Adopters' Qualifications
In the United States, adopters' qualifications are based on fulfill-
ment of specific state requirements, usually very simple and objective,
and by a much more extensive investigation by a social worker.
Although final approval of the adopters is in the hands of the court,
judges typically rely almost entirely on the advice of the investigator.
Under the Convention, determination of the adopters' qualifica-
tions is a responsibility allocated to the receiving nation. Thus, adopt-
ers will be unable to proceed either in a U.S. or foreign court without
confirmation of their qualifications by appropriate authorities in the
receiving nation. The Convention's allocation of responsibility satis-
fies the receiving nation's interest in assuring the qualifications of its
own residents, but it does not address the nation of origin's interest in
this matter. The question remains, when the U.S. is the nation of ori-
gin, should a court accept the adopters' approval by foreign authori-
ties or require additional approval in conformity with local law.18
Of course, under present law or the Convention standing alone
there is no reason why a U.S. court or prospective central authority
must be bound by the recommendation of a foreign social worker,
foreign central authority, or foreign court. Indeed, several adoption
182. The same issue is presented if a U.S. central authority must approve a child's placement
and/or emigration for eventual adoption in a foreign court. Should the central authority base its
decision solely on the recommendation of foreign authorities, or should it require further investi-
gation by a local social worker?
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codes in the U.S. would appear absolutely to require yet another re-
port by an investigator qualified under local law."8 3 Should a law im-
plementing the Convention eliminate the additional investigation?
Continuation of existing requirements for additional local investi-
gation appears to be inevitable. Homestudies in other nations are
often much less rigorous than in the U.S. and the Convention offers
no guarantee of improvement of foreign homestudy standards. Thus,
the U.S. should protect its interests in the placement of U.S. born chil-
dren by permitting the continuation of local homestudy requirements.
For children actually adopted in the U.S. in anticipation of emigration,
it appears no additional federal legislation will be necessary to con-
tinue local requirements, except perhaps to confirm explicitly that
U.S. courts are not bound by foreign recommendations. However, if a
child will emigrate for the purpose of adoption in a foreign court, the
U.S. may need either state or federal legislation to withhold approval
of the child's placement and emigration until an appropriate authority
in the U.S. has confirmed that the adopters' qualifications are
satisfactory.
D. Determination of the Child's Adoptability
The Convention allocates to the nation of origin the responsibil-
ity for determining a child's availability for intercountry adoption.
This determination involves something more than a finding that a
child is available for adoption in the general sense. Even if the child is
clearly adoptable by U.S. residents, intercountry adoption would re-
quire a competent authority to consider local placement opportunities
and find that intercountry placement is in the child's best interests.184
There is no indication as to who would serve as the competent author-
ity for this purpose in the United States.
A few states now authorize a judge or adoption agency to make
similar determinations whenever nonresidents seek to adopt a locally-
born child.185 These jurisdictions sometimes mandate a strong prefer-
ence for local placement even before placement in another U.S. juris-
diction. Such preferences for local placement appear to be consistent
183. JoAN HOLLINOER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRAcrICE § 4.05[1][c] (5th ed. 1993 & Supp.
1993).
184. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1139 (Preamble).
185. See, eg., FLA. STAT. § 63.207 (West 1992) (prohibiting out-of-state placement except by
a licensed agency or by the Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Services); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-1647 (Law. Co-op 1993) (allowing adoption of resident children only by residents, except
in unusual or exceptional circumstances).
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with the Convention, provided the law favors adoption and permits
out-of-state placement in a child's best interests.18 6 Many states, how-
ever, appear to have no procedure for, or restrictions against, out-of-
state placement.'87 In any event, local laws of any sort would be inef-
fective standing alone, because there are no federal exit controls to
prevent a child's removal from the U.S. for the purpose of adoption
elsewhere.
Thus, federal implementing legislation must create some system
for restricting the emigration of children in violation of the Conven-
tion or local law. Given the practical difficulties and improbability of
effective enforcement of exit controls at U.S. borders, enforcement of
U.S. rules on emigration for adoption will depend substantially on
Convention compliance by foreign adoption tribunals. Of course, the
need for such cooperation by foreign authorities to protect U.S. born
children is an additional argument in favor of the Convention.
A separate problem involves confirmation of the Convention's
minimum standards for a child's relinquishment for adoption. U.S.
adoption law typically requires that a birth parent's relinquishment
must be in writing, that the relinquishment must be after the child's
birth, and that the relinquishment must not be caused by improper
inducements or duress.' 8 The Convention has similar but not neces-
sarily identical requirements. For example, the Convention would re-
quire certain counselling for birth mothers, guardians, and older
children. 8 9 The surest method of implementing these requirements
would be to amend local laws, where necessary, to conform with the
Convention, at least for intercountry adoptions, and for the appointed
central authorities to confirm compliance when they approve the
child's placement, emigration, and adoption.
Finally, a child is not available for adoption under the Conven-
tion if a birth parent's or guardian's relinquishment was induced by
payment or compensation of any kind. 90 Nearly all states have some
rule restricting such inducements,' 91 but their rules are often surpris-
ingly deficient and possibly inadequate to satisfy the Convention. For
example, many states expressly authorize adopters to pay a birth par-
ent's reasonable living expenses during pregnancy, but fail to provide
186. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
187. See JOAN HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACrICE § 3.07[3] (5th ed. 1993 & Supp.).
188. Id. at § 2.11.
189. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 4(c)(1), 4(d)).
190. Hague Conference, supra note 4, at 1140 (art. 4(c)(3)).
191. HOLLINGER, supra note 187, at § 3.05[3].
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clearly that such payments or benefits must not be contingent on the
birth parent's relinquishment of the child. In the absence of clear stat-
utory direction, state courts have sometimes relied on criminal sale of
children laws and ancient common law rules as evidence of a public
policy against unreasonable or contingent payments or benefits to
birth parents. 192 Nevertheless, existing state laws are not sufficiently
clear across the board to assure compliance with the Convention or
protection of U.S. interests in the emigration of U.S. born children.
Implementing legislation should therefore include the prohibition
against improper financial inducements as a matter of federal law.
V. CONCLUSION
The Hague Convention offers important advantages to the
United States. For adoption agencies and prospective adopters, the
Convention may encourage other nations to accept adoption more
willingly as an alternative for millions of children without families.
For those who do adopt from other nations, the Convention offers the
security of international and federal legal recognition of their adoptive
families. These benefits come with the cost of additional institutions
to facilitate and monitor the process, a cost which ultimately must be
borne by adoptive families, agencies or taxpayers. But a careful shar-
ing of responsibility between local and federal authorities and the use
of existing state and federal institutions can keep the Convention's
price within an easily justifiable range.
192. HOLLINGER, supra note 187, at § 3.05[3].
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APPENDIX A
Duties and Tasks
Determine that child is
adoptable, and that con-
sent and counseling require-
ments are fulfilled. (Arti-
cle 4)
Determine that prospective
adopters are "eligible and





adoption laws and statis-
tics, share information




gain in connection with an
adoption; deter other prac-




cerning the child and the




"Competent authority" in nation of origin.
In the U.S., a state court determines a child's
adoptability in a voluntary or involuntary
termination of the birth parents' relationship
to the child. Some specific determinations
required by Article 4 (e.g., that intercountry
adoption is in the child's best interests) are
not routine for state courts under current law
and practice. However, it appears that such
additional determinations could be made by
other public officials, or even by accredited
private agencies, depending on the manner
in which the U.S. implements the
Convention. See Articles 16, 22.
"Competent authority" in receiving nation.
In accordance with the existing scheme (U.S.
as receiving nation), the INS could perform
this task by requiring a favorable homestudy
by an accredited agency or professional, and
by correspondence with state officials to
verify fulfullment of basic state eligibility
requirements.
"Central authorities" in the respective
nations. In the U.S., there will almost cer-
tainly be a central authority within the fed-
eral government to perform these functions,
but it could share responsibility with other
"central authorities" within Article 6.
Federal and/or state central authorities, with
the assistance of the usual federal and state
law enforcement officials.
Federal and/or state central authorities,
accredited adoption agencies, and public
officials (e.g., court clerk, child welfare offi-
cial, public records clerk).
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about experience with inter-
country adoption. (Arti-
cle 9(d)).
Reply to another nation's
request for information
about a particular adop-
tion. (Article 9(e)).
Accredit intercountry adop-






ity, prepare report regard-
ing adopters, transmit
report to a central author-
ity in the nation of origin.
(Article 15).
Federal and/or state central authorities,
accredited adoption agencies, other public
officials involved in the adoption (e.g., a
judge, court clerk, child welfare official).
Federal and/or state central authorities,
accredited adoption agencies, other public
officials. (e.g., family and child welfare agen-
cies). In the U.S., most state family and child
welfare agencies are already performing this
task by requiring adoption agencies to pro-
vide counselling services, although they do
not always require post-adoption counselling
services.*
Federal and/or state central authorities,
accredited adoption agencies, other public
officials involved in adoption. In the U.S., it
would be especially useful to have a federal
central authority serve as a clearinghouse for
the collection of data and preparation of
summaries and reports.
Federal and/or state central authorities,
accredited adoption agencies, and other pub-
lic authorities (e.g., a court clerk).
See section III(E) of this article.
State or federal central authority, accredited
agency or professional. In the U.S., the INS
already receives the equivalent of such an
application when prospective adopters peti-
tion on behalf of a prospective immigrant
adoptive child.
State or federal central authority, agency/
professional performing CA tasks.** The
INS now requires a favorable homestudy by
an accredited agency or professional, and
confirms eligibility under state law by con-
tacting state family welfare officials. This
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Confirm child's adoptabil-
ity, prepare report and




particular placement is in
the child's best interests;
give due consideration to
the child's upbringing and
ethnic, religious and cul-
tural background. (Article
16).
Approve transfer of cus-
tody to prospective adopt-
ers (in nation of origin)
pending immigration and/
or adoption). (Article 17).
Take all necessary steps to
obtain permission for the
child's departure from
nation of origin, and entry
and permanent residence
in receiving nation. (Arti-
cle 18.)
State or federal central authority, agency/
professional performing CA tasks.** If the
U.S. is a nation of origin, these tasks will
likely be performed by a state child welfare
agency, accredited private agency, or social
worker. A lawyer might be responsible for
transmitting the report.
Federal or state central authority, accredited
agency or professional performing CA
tasks.** In the U.S., this task will likely be
performed by a state child welfare agency,
accredited private agency, or professional
(such as a social worker, or for some tasks, a
lawyer). In the case of an independent
placement (without an agency) of a U.S.
born child, the U.S. will need to authorize its
federal or state central authorities to per-
form this task directly or through a profes-
sional, such as a social worker.
This task is important only when prospective
adopters will have custody of the child in the
nation of origin before the adoption. The
approval depends on a number of specific
determinations listed in Article 17. Where
the U.S. is a receiving nation, the most
important item will be a determination that
the child will be eligible to immigrate to the
U.S. as a permanent resident. The INS is
naturally suited to this task, because it
already makes the same determination as a
precondition for a prospective adoptive
child's entry to the U.S. Other items, such as
approving transfer of custody and agreeing
that an adoption should proceed, are respon-
sibilities of the agencies/professionals per-
forming CA tasks** in the adoption. In an
independent (nonagency) adoption by U.S.
residents or of a U.S. born child, a federal or
state central authority will need to approve
the transfer of custody.
If the requirements of Article 17 are not yet
fulfulled (because the adopters did not
receive custody in the nation of origin), the
requirements of Article 17 apply at this
point.
53
Carlson: The Emerging Law of Introductory Adoptions: An Analysis of the Ha
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1994
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Assure that pre-conditions
for child's transfer to
receiving nation, and to
custody of prospective
adopters, are satisfied
before such transfer. Arti-
cle 19(1).
Ensure that transfer takes
place in secure and appro-
priate circumstances and, if
possible, in the company of





regarding the status of the
adoption. (Article 20).
Responsibility in case of
failed adoption; temporary
care; new adoptive place-
ment. (Article 21).
Primary responsibility for this task would
rest with the agency/professional performing
CA tasks with respect to the adoption.**
However, Article 18 may also impose a duty
on other government "central authorities" to
provide appropriate assistance to facilitate
the child's transfer in an agency or independ-
ent adoption.
Primary responsibility will rest with the
agency/professional performing CA tasks**
in the adoption. In the case of an independ-
ent adoption, it is unclear how central
authorities in either nation can fulfill this
duty except by inquiring about the adopters'
travel arrangements with the child (perhaps
at the point of approving custody), and/or by
obtaining the adopters' agreement to adhere
to certain conduct in the transfer.
Primary responsibility will rest with the
agency/professional performing CA tasks**
in the adoption. In the case of an independ-
ent adoption, where the U.S. is the receiving
nation, the federal or state central authority
will need to be available to assist the nation
of origin in determining the status of the
adoption. Whenever the U.S. is the nation
of origin, and especially in the case of
independent adoptions, a U.S. federal or
state central authority might rely on Article
20 to follow the progress of the adoption.
Primary responsibility will rest with the
agency/professional performing CA tasks**
in the adoption. In a new adoptive place-
ment, the receiving agency or professional
must act in consultation with the central
authority of the nation of origin.
* See, e.g., MICHIGAN DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVICES, LICENSING RULES OF CHILD PLACING
AGENCIES R400.6509 to R400.6515 (Dec. 1980).
** Under Article 22, many of the procedural tasks assigned to the "central authorities" in
Articles 14 through 21 may also be performed by an accredited private or public intercountry
adoption agency, or by certain types of professionals. By "CA tasks" I mean one of the proce-
dural tasks a signatory nation may permissibly delegate to such agencies and professionals.
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PLACING AGENCIES (4th ed.
1989).
ALASKA STAT. § 47.35.100
(1990); ALASKA DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERV.,
A GUIDEBOOK TO ALASKA'S
PLACEMENT AGENCY
REGULATIONS (1989)
(codified at ALASKA ADMIN.
CODE tit. 7, §§ 51.010 to .220,
51.400 to 52.900 (July 1989)).
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.






ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-402
(Michie 1993); ARKANSAS
DEP'T OF HUMAN SERV.,





CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 1501-25.5 (West 1990
& Supp. 1994); CAL. CODE
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COL. REV. STAT. § 26-6-101
to 26-6-114 (1973 & Supp.
1994); COLORADO DEP'T OF




CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45a-727 (1993 & Supp.
1994); CONN. AGENCIES
REGS. §§ 17a-149 to -150
(1992 & Supp. 1994).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31,
§§ 351-355 (1974);
DELAWARE DEP'T OF SERV.





D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1002
to 32-1011 (Supp. 1994); D.C.
REG., 3033-71 (May 11, 1990)
(to be codified at 29 D.C.
MUN. REGS. ch. 16).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.202
(West 1985 & Supp. 1994);




(codified at FLA. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. r. 1OM-24
(1990)).
GA. CODE Am. §§ 49-5-3,
49-5-12, 49-5-12.1 (Michie
1990) GA. COMp. R. & REGS.
r. 290-2-12 (1984).
None.
IDAHO CODE §§ 39-1201 to
-1213, 56-204A (1993); RULES
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Illinois ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2 years No
2212.05 (1994); ILLINOIS




Indiana IND. CODE ANN. § 12-17.4-6- 1 year No
1 to 12-17.4-6-33 (Bums
Supp. 1994); 470 IND.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 470 r. 3-2-1
to 3-2-12.
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 238.1 to 1 year No
238.45 (1994); IOWA ADMIN.
CODE r. 441-108.1 to .11
(1992).
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-503 6 mos. No
to -504 (1992); KANSAS







1983) (codified at KAN.
ADMIN. REGS. §§ 28-8-170 to
-179).
Kentucky Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. 1 year No
§§ 199.640-.670 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1991 & Supp.
1992); 905 Ky. ADMIN. PEGS.
1:310 (1992).
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 1 year No
§§ 46:1401-:1424 (West Supp.
1994); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit.
48, ch. 41 (1987).
Maine ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 1 year Yes
§§ 8201-8205 (West 1964 &
Supp. 1993); MAINE DEP'T
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Maryland MD. [FAM. LAW] CODE ANN. 5 years Yes
§§ 5-501 to 5-520 (1991 &
Supp. 1994); MD. REGS.
CODE, tit. 7, § 13.
Mass. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 2 years Yes
28A, §§ 1-16 (West 1994);
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 102,
§§ 5.01-11 (1990).
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 2 years No
§ 722.111-.127 (West 1993);
MICHIGAN DEP'T OF SOCIAL
SERV., LICENSING RULES FOR
CHILD PLACING AGENCIES
(1980) (codified at MICH.
ADMIN. CODE r. 400.6101-
.6152, 400.6501-.6522).
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. 1 year Yes
§§ 245A.01-.09 (West 1994);
MINN. R. 9545.0750 to .0830.
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-15-1 1 year No
to -23 (1972); MississiPPi




Missouri Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.201 6 mos. Yes
to .245, 210.481 to .536,
453.014 (Vernon 1983 &
Supp. 1994); MISSOURI DEP'T
OF SOCIAL SERv., DIV. OF
FAMILY SERV., RULES FOR
LICENSING: CHILD PLACING
AGENCIES (1982) (codified at
Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 13,
§ 40-73.010 to .090).
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 52-2- 1 year Yes
401 to -407 (1993); MONTANA




AGENCIES (1988) (codified at
MONT. ADMIN. R.
§§ 11.11.121 to .124 (1988)).
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NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-701 to
-709 (1988 & Supp. 1992);
NEBRASKA DEP'T SOCIAL
SERV., PROGRAM MANUAL
§ 474 NAC 6-005.27 (1983).
NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 127.220-
.310 (1991); NEVADA Div. OF





N.H. STAT. ANN. § 170-E:l






N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3-38 to
-40 (Supp. 1994); NEW
JERSEY DEP'T OF HUMAN
SERV., DIV. OF YOUTH AND
FAMILY SERV., BUREAU OF
LICENSING, MANUAL OF
STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION
AGENCIES (1991) (codified at
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10
§ 121A).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-7A-1





N.Y. [Soc. SERV.] LAW § 374
(McKinney 1992); N.Y.
COMP. CODES OF R. AND
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N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131D-1,
131D-10.1 to -10.9 (1993 &
Supp. 1993); NORTH
CAROLINA DEP'T OF HUMAN
RESOURCES, Div. OF SOCIAL
SERV., RULES OF LICENSING:
CHILD PLACING AGENCIES
(1990) (codified at N.C.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 10 r. 41N-P
(1990)).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-01
to -15 (1989 & Supp. 1993);




(codified at N.D. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 75-03-16-01 to -09).
OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 5103.01 to .05, .016, .017
(Baldwin 1989 & Supp.
1993); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
§§ 5101:2-5-01 to -34 (1991).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 401-419 (1987 & 1994




OR. REv. STAT. §H 418.205-
.327 (1993); OR. ADMIN. R.
412-24-005 to 412-24-050
(1979).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 901-
911 1966 & Supp. 1994); 55
PA. CODE §§ 20.1 to .82,
3680.1 to .63 (1987).
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 81
(1976)
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-72.1-1
to -8 (1993); RHODE ISLAND
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S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-
1650(e), 20-7-2230 to -2290
(1985 & Supp. 1993); S.C.
CODE REGS. §§ 114-4910 to
-4980 (1992).
S.D.CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 26-6-1 to -25 (1992 & Supp.
1994); S.D. ADMIN. R.
§ 67:42:01:01 to :35,
67:42:09:01 to :27 (1991).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 71-3-
501 to -531 (1987 & Supp.





(codified at TENN. COMP. R.
& REGS. § 1240-4-9-.01 to
.12).
TEX. [HUM. RES.] CODE
ANN. § 42.041-.077 (1990
Supp. 1994); 40 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 720.25-.60 (Supp.
1994).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-2-
101-116 (1993); UTAH DEP'T
HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF
LICENSING, CHILD PLACING
AGENCY RULES (1991)
(codified at UTAH ADMIN. R.
501-7).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 432
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VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-195 to
-219 (1991 & Supp. 1994);









V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 3
§ 431(b) (Supp. 1993).
WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 74.15.101-.170 (1982 &
Supp. 1994); WASHINGTON




AGENCIES (1987) (codified at
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-
73-010 to -216 (1978)).
W. VA. CODE § 49-2B-3 to
-11 (1992); WEST VIRGINIA




Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.60-.78
(West 1987 & Supp. 1993);
WIS. ADMIN. CODE §§ HSS
54.01-.06 (May 1993).
Wyo. STAT. § 14-4-101 to
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